Egyptian protesters calling for the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi gather in Cairo's landmark Tahrir Square on 2 July 2013 as laser lights directed at the government building spell "18 hours" in Arabic in reference to the warning on 1 July by the armed forces. (Photo: AFP - Khaled Desouki)
On Monday, July 1, the Egyptian military issued a statement giving President Mohamed Mursi 48 hours to respond to the demands of protesters. The presidency, however, rejected the ultimatum, declaring that it was issued without its approval. Similarly, the Islamist alliance announced its strong rejection of the military’s statement, demanding the commitment to legitimacy and calling for rallies around Egypt to support Morsi.
There is growing talk of Islamists adopting an "edge of the abyss" scenario in Egypt, especially following news that Mursi is under house arrest at the Republican Guard's clubhouse. (The house arrest has not been announced officially, so as to avoid the wrath of the Islamists.) This development comes in the midst of increased talk about the US administration abandoning Mursi, and the army wishing for his departure.
The "edge of the abyss" scenario depends in essence on escalating tensions in the public sphere so that explosion seems imminent. The first objective is exhibiting to public opinion that there is a balance of powers between all sides, in order to lower the ceiling of expectations for the opposition and gain some pressure points for the loyal side.
The second objective is to throw the military's position into disarray and send a message that Mursi cannot be removed by force like Mubarak. The army will be forced to pressure the opposition to accept a solution based on a government reshuffle or resignation and early elections, following Ramadan, which means in 6 to 8 weeks. In addition, Mursi will commit to create a committee to amend the constitutional articles under contention, which was one of the main opposition demands before the recent escalation calling for early presidential elections.
The third objective is to put opponents in a moral dilemma by holding demonstrations away from the major rallies. If they get attacked, the loyalists will look like they were the victims of the opposition, which will then seem unqualified for transition. This will gain the Islamists more time in a long-winded battle until the start of Ramadan on July 10. They believe this will reduce the sharpness of the situation.
The fourth objective, which is the worst case scenario for the Brotherhood, is guaranteeing safe-passage to Mursi and the Islamists in case of further escalation.
It is clear that the Brotherhood and Islamists are afraid of repeating the 1954 scenario, when Gamal Abdel Nasser turned against Mohammed Naguib and crushed the Brotherhood. This scenario scares the Brotherhood’s leadership more than any other party since many of them witnessed it. In the meantime, there are also the remnants of the former ruling party and state security who want vengeance and wish to crush the Brotherhood.
However, there is another voice on the Islamist side, which speaks of the importance of making various effective concessions to absorb the anger in the streets and safeguard whatever is left of the historical and social achievements of the Islamists, and the Brotherhood in particular.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
There is growing talk of Islamists adopting an "edge of the abyss" scenario in Egypt, especially following news that Mursi is under house arrest at the Republican Guard's clubhouse. (The house arrest has not been announced officially, so as to avoid the wrath of the Islamists.) This development comes in the midst of increased talk about the US administration abandoning Mursi, and the army wishing for his departure.
The "edge of the abyss" scenario depends in essence on escalating tensions in the public sphere so that explosion seems imminent. The first objective is exhibiting to public opinion that there is a balance of powers between all sides, in order to lower the ceiling of expectations for the opposition and gain some pressure points for the loyal side.
The second objective is to throw the military's position into disarray and send a message that Mursi cannot be removed by force like Mubarak. The army will be forced to pressure the opposition to accept a solution based on a government reshuffle or resignation and early elections, following Ramadan, which means in 6 to 8 weeks. In addition, Mursi will commit to create a committee to amend the constitutional articles under contention, which was one of the main opposition demands before the recent escalation calling for early presidential elections.
The third objective is to put opponents in a moral dilemma by holding demonstrations away from the major rallies. If they get attacked, the loyalists will look like they were the victims of the opposition, which will then seem unqualified for transition. This will gain the Islamists more time in a long-winded battle until the start of Ramadan on July 10. They believe this will reduce the sharpness of the situation.
The fourth objective, which is the worst case scenario for the Brotherhood, is guaranteeing safe-passage to Mursi and the Islamists in case of further escalation.
It is clear that the Brotherhood and Islamists are afraid of repeating the 1954 scenario, when Gamal Abdel Nasser turned against Mohammed Naguib and crushed the Brotherhood. This scenario scares the Brotherhood’s leadership more than any other party since many of them witnessed it. In the meantime, there are also the remnants of the former ruling party and state security who want vengeance and wish to crush the Brotherhood.
However, there is another voice on the Islamist side, which speaks of the importance of making various effective concessions to absorb the anger in the streets and safeguard whatever is left of the historical and social achievements of the Islamists, and the Brotherhood in particular.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.