Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and ousted Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi are prevented from gathering outside the Supreme Constitutional Court building by Egyptian police special forces after the swearing in ceremony of newly appointed interim president Adly Mansour on 4 July 2013 in Cairo. (Photo: AFP - Khaled Desouki)
The Muslim Brotherhood is a reformist, not a revolutionary entity. It embraces the concepts of alliances and middle ground, in addition to preferring tactical over strategic gains. The group is unable to accept ideas that carry radical and quick solutions, as was clear in its behavior toward Egypt’s youth, which it pushed away once it realized it could not be contained.
This reformist composition is an indicator of the Brotherhood’s pragmatism. It is sometimes moral, but can be opportunist. Inside the revolutionary atmosphere following the January 25 revolution, this put the Brotherhood in an adversarial position with a wide section of the enthusiastic youth, who saw that the group couldn’t be trusted with the goals of the revolution, even if it had good intentions. This made the Brotherhood an easy target for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which also leads a non-revolutionary organization that prefers negotiation and concession.
The Brotherhood's pragmatism goes hand-in-hand with dogmatic ideological positions that ensure its survival as an organization. Everything fuels its conviction that all events will ultimately feed into the Islamist project, in the interest of the state, and that all mistakes committed by the Brotherhood will not impact the progress of this project.
This vision led the Brotherhood to favor the principles of loyalty and trust over those of efficiency and competence in the internal promotion of its cadre. Consequently, the Brotherhood held on to the idea that it was stronger and better, leading to an introverted belief system suspended on superiority of religion. The Brotherhood missed real opportunities for partnership and wider assimilation into society.
The Brotherhood’s decisions and practical positions provided several justifications for the animosity of its adversaries and enemies. Many were led to believe that the Brotherhood aimed to liquidate its adversaries morally, even if they were former members. Another fatal Brotherhood mistake was their propensity for flashy slogans and big promises. This raised the level of expectations for many, especially after the promotion of the so-called "100-day plan" and "al-Nahda [renaissance] program."
Observers believe that the Brotherhood’s main governance mistake is their not paying attention to the ramifications of having a “Brotherhood president at the head of the Egyptian state directly following a revolution with strong enemies of the state.” They ignored the fact that the best situation for the Brotherhood is to act as a parliamentary pressure group.
To make matters worse, they chose one of their "soldiers" as a presidential candidate. Mohamed Mursi was nominated based on his loyalty to the Brotherhood, not his potential competence as president.
Another mistake was muddled vision. The Brotherhood would sometimes enter into an alliance with civil groups, some of which are secular, losing its Islamist supporters. At other times, it would get closer to Islamist currents that it had once deemed extreme. This was apparent in the parliamentary elections and the referendums, as well as in the way it dealt with the government of Kamal al-Ganzouri.
In addition to all these mistakes, the Brotherhood did not take any steps to reassure political forces. It acted as if the state was stable at a time when half of it was in revolt and the other half deeply entrenched. This was a major strategic error, which left the Brotherhood standing alone.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
This reformist composition is an indicator of the Brotherhood’s pragmatism. It is sometimes moral, but can be opportunist. Inside the revolutionary atmosphere following the January 25 revolution, this put the Brotherhood in an adversarial position with a wide section of the enthusiastic youth, who saw that the group couldn’t be trusted with the goals of the revolution, even if it had good intentions. This made the Brotherhood an easy target for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which also leads a non-revolutionary organization that prefers negotiation and concession.
The Brotherhood's pragmatism goes hand-in-hand with dogmatic ideological positions that ensure its survival as an organization. Everything fuels its conviction that all events will ultimately feed into the Islamist project, in the interest of the state, and that all mistakes committed by the Brotherhood will not impact the progress of this project.
This vision led the Brotherhood to favor the principles of loyalty and trust over those of efficiency and competence in the internal promotion of its cadre. Consequently, the Brotherhood held on to the idea that it was stronger and better, leading to an introverted belief system suspended on superiority of religion. The Brotherhood missed real opportunities for partnership and wider assimilation into society.
The Brotherhood’s decisions and practical positions provided several justifications for the animosity of its adversaries and enemies. Many were led to believe that the Brotherhood aimed to liquidate its adversaries morally, even if they were former members. Another fatal Brotherhood mistake was their propensity for flashy slogans and big promises. This raised the level of expectations for many, especially after the promotion of the so-called "100-day plan" and "al-Nahda [renaissance] program."
Observers believe that the Brotherhood’s main governance mistake is their not paying attention to the ramifications of having a “Brotherhood president at the head of the Egyptian state directly following a revolution with strong enemies of the state.” They ignored the fact that the best situation for the Brotherhood is to act as a parliamentary pressure group.
To make matters worse, they chose one of their "soldiers" as a presidential candidate. Mohamed Mursi was nominated based on his loyalty to the Brotherhood, not his potential competence as president.
Another mistake was muddled vision. The Brotherhood would sometimes enter into an alliance with civil groups, some of which are secular, losing its Islamist supporters. At other times, it would get closer to Islamist currents that it had once deemed extreme. This was apparent in the parliamentary elections and the referendums, as well as in the way it dealt with the government of Kamal al-Ganzouri.
In addition to all these mistakes, the Brotherhood did not take any steps to reassure political forces. It acted as if the state was stable at a time when half of it was in revolt and the other half deeply entrenched. This was a major strategic error, which left the Brotherhood standing alone.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.