Istanbul– The most bellicose reaction to the “military coup” in Egypt has come from Turkey. Turkish officials, led by President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, could not hide their extreme fury at the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood-led regime in Egypt, which they deemed a blow to democracy and constitutional legitimacy, using deposed President Mohamed Mursi’s terminology.
Ankara’s biggest shock came when US and European officials expressed their indirect consent to the coup that toppled the most important regional ally of Turkey’s Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP). Another kick in the teeth came from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf countries, which endorsed the military coup in Egypt as it was unfolding.
These developments are nothing short of a knockout blow to the dreams and fancies of Erdogan, who knows very well that without the Brotherhood regime in Egypt, he will be powerless in the region. One reflection of this schism was the election of pro-Saudi Ahmad al-Jarba as the new head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition, instead of Mustafa al-Sabbagh, Qatar and Turkey’s opposition pointman.
Ankara is recalibrating its position on Egypt and the region in general. Turkey had cultivated complex and extensive ties with Egypt under Mursi, and there is no doubt that the new Egyptian administration will now carefully review these ties.
That much was clear when the Turkish ambassador in Cairo was summoned by the Egyptian foreign ministry, to protest what it called blatant Turkish intervention in Egypt’s internal affairs. The broad overlap in everything from politics to ideology between the Turkish AKP and the Brotherhood, is common knowledge, and therefore, many expect Erdogan to enlist all his resources to restore their regime in Egypt, no matter the cost.
For instance, the Turkish state-run Anadolu News Agency opened a major office in Cairo to disseminate pro-AKP and Brotherhood propaganda, among other things. Turkish entrepreneurs close to Erdogan, meanwhile, forged intricate business ties with Egyptian businessmen and state-owned companies under the auspices of Mursi.
Some have put the value of Turkish investments in Egypt at around $2.5 billion. But it seems almost inevitable that the new Egyptian administration will review these, whether now or after elections, especially if the Brotherhood fails to win enough votes to return to power.
It seems increasingly unlikely that the Brotherhood will return to power, given the present regional and international climate, which can be summed up thus: Having tried the Brotherhood, the West is now convinced that the Islamist group has failed, posing a threat to its interests.
Unbeknownst to Erdogan, the Egyptians seem to have heeded his advice to adhere to secularism, which he gave them during his much-hyped visit to Cairo last November. Today, the majority of the Egyptian people are convinced that the Brotherhood model in Turkey, as incarnated in the AKP, is a threat to them, especially after the brutal crackdowns in Taksim Square.
The Egyptians have come to believe that Mursi was copying this model without regard to the fundamental differences between the two countries and their peoples. Mursi, moreover, apparently wanted to fully implement the AKP’s model in just one year, and forgot in his haste that Erdogan’s victories against the army and his secular opponents took 10 years and absolute US support to accomplish.
Erdogan remains the biggest loser in the final tally of regional developments in the aftermath of the Brotherhood’s ouster in Egypt, with possible implications on developments in the Syrian battlefield. Particularly so given the Qatari-Saudi divergence, which has led to bloody clashes between the Free Syrian Army, al-Nusra Front, and other militant factions, in conjunction with the advances being made by the Syrian army in many strategic locations in Syria.
The most important question is whether Erdogan will accept this major defeat, or whether he will counter attack to prevent bigger losses, as the fall of the Brotherhood regime will produce new Arab realities that the Turks will not be able to cope with easily.
Erdogan once believed that he would easily become the leader of the Arab region, though everyone knows throughout its history that it could never accept to have such a leader. The best thing Erdogan and his advisers can do is to seek to understand the region as it is, and not as it is portrayed by their Brotherhood allies.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
Ankara’s biggest shock came when US and European officials expressed their indirect consent to the coup that toppled the most important regional ally of Turkey’s Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (AKP). Another kick in the teeth came from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf countries, which endorsed the military coup in Egypt as it was unfolding.
These developments are nothing short of a knockout blow to the dreams and fancies of Erdogan, who knows very well that without the Brotherhood regime in Egypt, he will be powerless in the region. One reflection of this schism was the election of pro-Saudi Ahmad al-Jarba as the new head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition, instead of Mustafa al-Sabbagh, Qatar and Turkey’s opposition pointman.
Ankara is recalibrating its position on Egypt and the region in general. Turkey had cultivated complex and extensive ties with Egypt under Mursi, and there is no doubt that the new Egyptian administration will now carefully review these ties.
That much was clear when the Turkish ambassador in Cairo was summoned by the Egyptian foreign ministry, to protest what it called blatant Turkish intervention in Egypt’s internal affairs. The broad overlap in everything from politics to ideology between the Turkish AKP and the Brotherhood, is common knowledge, and therefore, many expect Erdogan to enlist all his resources to restore their regime in Egypt, no matter the cost.
For instance, the Turkish state-run Anadolu News Agency opened a major office in Cairo to disseminate pro-AKP and Brotherhood propaganda, among other things. Turkish entrepreneurs close to Erdogan, meanwhile, forged intricate business ties with Egyptian businessmen and state-owned companies under the auspices of Mursi.
Some have put the value of Turkish investments in Egypt at around $2.5 billion. But it seems almost inevitable that the new Egyptian administration will review these, whether now or after elections, especially if the Brotherhood fails to win enough votes to return to power.
It seems increasingly unlikely that the Brotherhood will return to power, given the present regional and international climate, which can be summed up thus: Having tried the Brotherhood, the West is now convinced that the Islamist group has failed, posing a threat to its interests.
Unbeknownst to Erdogan, the Egyptians seem to have heeded his advice to adhere to secularism, which he gave them during his much-hyped visit to Cairo last November. Today, the majority of the Egyptian people are convinced that the Brotherhood model in Turkey, as incarnated in the AKP, is a threat to them, especially after the brutal crackdowns in Taksim Square.
The Egyptians have come to believe that Mursi was copying this model without regard to the fundamental differences between the two countries and their peoples. Mursi, moreover, apparently wanted to fully implement the AKP’s model in just one year, and forgot in his haste that Erdogan’s victories against the army and his secular opponents took 10 years and absolute US support to accomplish.
Erdogan remains the biggest loser in the final tally of regional developments in the aftermath of the Brotherhood’s ouster in Egypt, with possible implications on developments in the Syrian battlefield. Particularly so given the Qatari-Saudi divergence, which has led to bloody clashes between the Free Syrian Army, al-Nusra Front, and other militant factions, in conjunction with the advances being made by the Syrian army in many strategic locations in Syria.
The most important question is whether Erdogan will accept this major defeat, or whether he will counter attack to prevent bigger losses, as the fall of the Brotherhood regime will produce new Arab realities that the Turks will not be able to cope with easily.
Erdogan once believed that he would easily become the leader of the Arab region, though everyone knows throughout its history that it could never accept to have such a leader. The best thing Erdogan and his advisers can do is to seek to understand the region as it is, and not as it is portrayed by their Brotherhood allies.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.