Egypt: Will the Military Learn From the Brotherhood’s Suicide?

The most basic lesson of the January 25 revolution in Egypt was lost on the Muslim Brotherhood. They seem to have missed the point that one of the key motivating factors that drove millions to the streets was to end dictatorship and authoritarianism. The revolts sought to break the idea of a power monopoly by any single party, group or person – regardless of their politics – in favor of governments that represent them in all their diversity.

Upon assuming power, the Brotherhood prepared to rule alone, believing that the people gave them that right by voting for them in the parliamentary and presidential elections. They didn’t even take advantage of the honeymoon period that usually accompanies revolutions of this kind, nor introduce policies that broke with the old order in any way, believing that if they allowed the opposition a little space in the media to express themselves, then that would be enough.

They did not do much better when it came to repositioning Egypt regionally and internationally, turning their attention to matters of concern for the Brotherhood organization and involving themselves in waging peripheral battles in places like Libya, Sudan, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen, without achieving much of note.

Before long, everyone was abandoning the Brotherhood, to the extent that they appeared small and isolated compared to the opposition, which managed to unite just about everyone else under its banner. The majority of Egyptians realized that their rule was an exact copy of the Mubarak regime, and on top of this, both the security situation and the economic outlook were worsening by the day.

This is when the armed forces became alarmed and sensed that the situation required their intervention. With the support of mass demonstrations on June 30, they moved in and deposed President Mohamed Mursi, propelling the country into another transitional period. But for this second revolution to be true to its January 25 predecessor, it must absorb the central lesson that no one force can rule exclusively and that power must be shared in a way that the full spectrum of Egyptian politics is represented.

Even the military must have a role, for it remains one of the few forces today that can maintain stability and prevent the descent into chaos. But such a role is very dangerous in the absence of a political force that can stand up to the military, be it in the streets or by wielding veto power in the political process.

The situation today is not at all similar to that of the 1952 revolution by the Free Officers. We are before a mass protest movement, whereby the army can play a supporting role and assist in achieving the demands of the revolution. But giving the military a blank check, even under the guise of fighting terrorism, would be a disastrous mistake.

The challenge today before the rebellious political forces is to prove that they are capable of managing the state, instead of standing on the sidelines welcoming the arrival of the army’s tanks.
Ibrahim al-Amin is editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.