"... In the era of Arab public uprisings, it is helpful to start with Arab public attitudes that have become increasingly important particularly in the formulation of policy toward Iran in post-Mubarak Egypt. These public attitudes also go to the heart of some of the worries about Iran felt by governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
Despite the Sunni-Shi’a divide—especially in Arab states where Shi’a populations are majorities or pluralities such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain—which is often matched by a division in attitude about Iran in these countries along sectarian lines, Sunni Arab populations elsewhere tend to base their views of Iran on issues that go far beyond this divide, and on some of which they are inclined to favor Iran. In polls I have conducted in six Arab countries—Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Lebanon—Iran consistently placed third on the list of choices provided by respondents when asked to identify the “two most threatening states,” indicating that many Arabs do see it as a threat. But what is more important in this case is that Arabs see Israel and the United States as presenting far greater threats. For example, in 2009, 88 percent of those polled identified Israel, 76 percent identified the United States, and only 12 percent identified Iran as one of the two greatest threats.1
There was some change a year after the start of the Arab uprisings in the November 2011 poll, although Iran remained far behind Israel and the United States: 71 percent identified Israel, 59 percent identified the United States, and 18 percent identified Iran as one ofthe two greatest threats.
This ranking of the Iranian threat in relation to Israel and the United States is particularly important with regard to the nuclear issue, where worries about Israel and the United States trump worries about Iran’s nuclear potential. Consistently, before and after the Arab uprisings, majorities of Arabs polled indicate their opposition to international pressure on Iran to curtail its nuclear program. This surprisingly includes Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel who certainly would be as affected as its Jewish citizens in case of an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel. The sense of “double standards” in dealing with Israel’s nuclear program on the one hand, and Arab and Muslim capabilities on the other, is one of the driving forces of Arab public attitudes on this issue. ..."
"Iran will continue to influence politics in the region, with or without war & regardless of what happens in Syria"
"... In fact, among those who appear to favor a possible American military strike on Iran, the betting is that Iran is much weaker than it looks militarily and that its ineffectiveness against a major American assault will only reveal its exaggerated claims and consequently reduce its influence, particularly related to its projected ability to stand up to Israel over the Palestinian issue. This betting is not widely shared among Arab governments, with many fearing that the consequences of war would be devastating to them and would play into Iran’s hands by tapping into the deep reservoir of Arab anger toward Israel and the United States.
There may be some convergence, for varying reasons, between Israel and some GCC states in favor of an American military campaign against Iran. But the difference in reasoning leads to different conclusions about a mediated deal with Iran and about the desired consequences of war. If Iran were to accept strict limits on enriching uranium on its soil and intrusive international inspections of its nuclear facilities, in exchange for total removal of international sanctions and acceptance of a regional role for Iran, Israeli and Saudi reactions would be different. Israel may be inclined to live with such a deal, although it would demand limits on Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas; the Saudis would feel uncomfortable with such a deal as it is likely to enhance Iranian economic and conventional power and provide further opportunities to expand Tehran’s influence. War, too, would likely have different, possibly opposite, consequences for Israel and GCC states, as Arab states worry about a wider regional war that could be more devastating to them than to Israel. For GCC states, sustained containment of Iran may be a preferred
strategy.
The complexity of these Arab attitudes meansthat, unless and until Egypt becomes a stable, popular, and credible Arab power that captures Arab public imaginations, Iran will continue to have ample opportunity to influence politics in the region, with or without war and regardless of what happens in Syria—particularly in the absence of IsraeliPalestinian peace. For American policy toward Iran, including the prospects of war, the starting point is, of course, an analysis of direct American interests. What is clear is that even aside from the potential military and economic costs of war with Iran, war is unlikely to limit, and can possibly expand, Iranian opportunities for influence in the Arab world—regardless of its consequences for Iran’s nuclear program."