Lebanon: Dangerous Proposal to Integrate Gangs into Security Forces

Imagine Ziad Allouki, an armed gang chief in Tripoli, as an official commander of a police precinct. Should the Lebanese prepare themselves for such an event? Anything goes in this country. Anything includes the prospects of appointing wanted criminals accused of terrorizing innocent civilians no less, into positions of maintaining security.

Around two months ago, in a public chat with journalists, Mikati said he "discussed with Interior Minister Marwan Charbel the possibility of the integration of these people [gang members and leaders] into the Internal Security Forces (ISF), just like with the militias after the civil war, especially since there is a new cycle to recruit 2,000 new members soon."

Mikati, whose portrait is displayed publicly in the offices of some of the militias, said he was "ready to help these young men find jobs, if they truly believed in remaining under the ceiling of the state and its authorities."

Charbel does not seem excited about the suggestion, however, he did not reject it "in principle." He used to be in the corps and was a brigadier general, therefore it is difficult for him when "the corps is insulted or undervalued."

Charbel informs Al-Akhbar that Mikati's proposal is "merely a suggestion, an idea for discussion and debate. But what I am certain of is that the law requires from all recruits to the security forces to have a clean judicial record and no prior criminal convictions. Therefore, I definitely cannot accept the enlistment of wanted criminals or prior convicts. Other than that, there's no problem."

Charbel confirms the ISF will be accepting 2,000 new recruits. "The security forces are still lacking in numbers according to the original mandate," he explains. "But those who want to join need to clean their judicial record first." Of course, the Lebanese do not need reminding that the state can withdraw arrest warrants as it wishes and even clear judicial records, no matter how sullied.

Mikati was clear in his proposal: He wants to replicate the post-Taif Agreement experience following the Lebanese civil war, when armed militias were integrated into the security forces. But this would address the effects and not the cause.

In 1990, after the civil war, the warlords signed the Taif Agreement, which stipulated: "Declaring the dissolution of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, with the reinforcement of the Internal Security Forces, through opening the door for recruitment of all Lebanese, with no exception, and their deployment into units in the governorates, following their participation in organized and regular training courses."

The former militants definitely needed all sorts of training concerning morals and conduct, though likely less training was needed in carrying and deploying arms – they could’ve even trained the state in this regard.

One officer, who preferred to remain anonymous, explains how they introduced "their militia behavior into the state security forces.” He continues: “Mentalities cannot change overnight. That is if we assume that it could change after all the blood they shed in the war." Some of them "are now officers, most of those reached the rank of major now. However, over time, they vanished into the body of the security forces and cannot be recognized." But has it become difficult to make them out because the institutions themselves have taken on the character of militias?

In the early 1990s, "integration" was supervised by then-interior minister Sami al-Khatib. He faltered at first and it took more than the scheduled time. Ultimately, around 1,600 "militiamen" were integrated into various security forces and the Lebanese army, according to shares agreed upon by the warlords.

"Back then, this meant collecting soldiers from various regions and sects in unified units. It was a difficult decision, after they had served in sectarian brigades," explains Brigadier General Elias Farhat of the Lebanese army. "Political powers were hesitant due to the objections of sectarian forces and apprehension of soldiers serving in areas they do not belong to."

Former commander of the gendarmerie Joseph Doueihy could not find words to describe the integration of "armed gangs" from Tripoli into the security forces. As an officer who was sent to retirement two months ago, he would feel "personally insulted if what they said happens. I was part of the corps for a long time and got wounded thrice in the line of duty against outlaws. And now they want to bring those in our place? Imagine a charlatan or thief becoming a priest or sheikh. Handing security to thugs is an issue that injures me deeply."

"I am saying it publicly. We need to recruit honest young men or what they call sons of good families. Other than that, we would be hurting ourselves," he says.

It is interesting that those armed gangs and their chiefs believe the step "needs to be studied." So, they do not mind joining the security forces in principle, but they need to think before putting their indispensable talents in the service of the state. This is what people close to armed gangs in Tripoli are saying.

A few days ago, Ziad Allouki sat in the chair of the ISF northern commander Mahmoud Anan and asked his friends to take pictures, before sharing them on social networking sites. The incident "hurt" the general, according to some, especially since the pictures were sent to officers and the interior minister. It was a message from the armed gangs that they were "the ones who decide." It will not be surprising if one of them asks to sit in the interior minister's chair one day.