Lebanon: March 14 Upset as Suleiman Backs Down

Every time President Suleiman vows to form a neutral government and is about to take the plunge, a blast goes off here or an assassination takes place there, putting his plans on hold. Sources indicate that Suleiman is still adamant on forming a government, however, this responsibility does not lie with the president alone but with the prime minister-designate as well. Besides, after the bombings that targeted minister Mohammed Shatah and the residents of Dahiyeh, one must be prudent and re-examine the local and regional political realities.

Suleiman’s advisers partially admit that the government he had intended to form was directed against Hezbollah and the Amal movement. “Therefore, it is impossible after the Dahiyeh bombing to shove a provocative government down the throat of Hezbollah and Amal supporters,” said a source. They also concede that the government will not be formed next week, after Armenian Christmas, as it had been indicated.

Some forces within March 14 are less disturbed by the bombings that have targeted different areas of Lebanon than by the idea that “reaction to these bombings leads to a chorus of statements calling for a national unity government, and Suleiman, under shell shock and out of fear, joins the chorus, prompting him to slow down.”

Suleiman’s “reluctance” makes him susceptible to March 14 criticism. In addition, he “not only fears March 8 forces,” but also “submits to pressure from the Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rai, who always calls for dialogue and forming a government in which all parties participate.”

This exacerbates concerns over the forthcoming government, which has become a daily obsession for March 14 forces because “there is no possibility to form a government in accordance with their agenda in the foreseeable future.” They believe “counting on Suleiman to form a government has been a losing bet.” They know the parliamentary majority would not allow them to form a March 14 government, as MP Walid Jumblatt insists on his decision not to give a vote of confidence to such a government. This is not to mention “the imbalance of power on the ground.”

Does that mean March 14 forces are afraid of a repeat of the 2008 conflict, or of the surprises that March 8 promised if a unilateral government is formed? On the surface, sources deny that fear of a replay of the “black shirts incident” – Hezbollah’s unarmed show of force in 2011 – prevents them from carrying out their threats.

March 14 forces are now stronger. They are aware that “the conditions are different from 2008.” Gloating, they say, “Hezbollah cannot open a domestic front in addition to the Syrian front.” Nonetheless, these sources stress “their party will not take one step on the question of the government if Suleiman does not take the initiative to form a neutral government.”

While waiting for Suleiman, “March 14 forces engage in an extensive debate on forming the government, given their differing views on the matter, without getting anywhere.” The Lebanese Forces do not want to participate in the national dialogue. The Phalanges made up their mind to support forming a political government.

Views within the Future Movement vary between supporters of a fait accompli government who refuse to participate in the national dialogue, and supporters of a neutral government who are convinced of the need to open the door to dialogue. The latter view is represented by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

Prominent Future Movement sources confirm that “forming a government is impossible under the current circumstances. Suleiman needs to be prudent because it is not right to make such a decision while the people injured in the bombings have not left the hospitals.”