Security coordination with the Europeans has intensified in a striking manner. European sources indicate that collaboration with Syria now includes sharing intelligence on names, movements, and even counter-terrorism techniques.Consequently, the regime’s silence cannot last for much longer. According to reliable reports, an announcement in this regard could be issued in the coming hours, unequivocally declaring ISIS a terrorist group. It helps that ISIS has claimed responsibility for the most recent bombing in Beirut’s southern suburb, a stronghold of Hezbollah, the Syrian regime’s ally.
How Does Damascus Benefit?
Damascus would benefit not only from rebutting accusations that it has been coordinating with ISIS, but also heading off those Damascus accuses of “inventing” the so-called Islamic Front ahead of Geneva II. For the Syrian regime, one of the purposes of the Islamic Front is to claim that it is an armed opposition group that is fighting terrorism.
In effect, Robert Ford, ex-American ambassador to Damascus, has been actively seeking to create an acceptable and effective military and political opposition force before Geneva II. This American desire intersects with those of Paris and Riyadh. The matter was discussed during French President Francois Hollande’s recent visit to Saudi. These countries and other regional and international actors do not want the Syrian regime to go to Geneva II in a position of strength.
The Islamic Front filled part of this vacuum. It offset some of the heavy losses that almost completely destroyed the FSA. It was thus necessary to polish the front’s image to appear moderate and at odds with al-Qaeda’s ideology and terrorism. The FSA had to be reinvigorated, especially after the advances of the Syrian army on multiple fronts in some areas. Something important in this regard may be declared in the coming days.
Russia sought to impose counterterrorism as the main theme of the Geneva II conference, and to present President Bashar al-Assad as a partner for the West in the fight against terror. The opposition’s – and Saudi’s – position was weakened as a result.
In the Meantime…
There was an attempt to blow up the Iranian embassy in Beirut. Former minister Mohammed Shatah was assassinated. Two suicide bombings hit the Russian city of Volgograd. Beirut’s southern suburb was hit with a third bombing. Saudi national Majed al-Majed, emir of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and al-Qaeda leader, was arrested and then died in custody, burying with him the mysteries surrounding his capture and death.
Before this, nearly a year ago, Maj. Gen. Wissam Hassan, head of the Lebanese Information Branch, was assassinated. Amid all this, Saudi intelligence chief Bandar bin Sultan failed to get Vladimir Putin to change his position on Syria in two visits to Moscow.
A quick look at all these seismic events gives one the impression we are seeing actions and reactions in the course of a battle between two axes in the region and the world. Maybe this is true and maybe not, but what is certain is that two major developments have transpired in the past few weeks, and could well alter the whole equation.
First of all, Putin has decided to take revenge. His public statements in this regard are but one-quarter of what is being reported from his private meetings and contacts. Putin said that those behind the incidents in Volgograd would greatly regret it.
Second, Iran, which had until now avoided accusing Saudi Arabia of involvement in the bombing outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut, has changed its tone. Spokesperson of the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee in the Iranian Shura Council, Hossein Naqavi Hosseini said, “Majed al-Majed was liquidated on account of the important information he held about terrorist operations and his links to senior Saudi officials including Bandar bin Sultan.”
This was echoed by Iranian Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alawi, who told Al-Mayadeen TV, “There are doubts surrounding the circumstances of Majed al-Majed’s death.” For his part, Mansour Haqiqat Pour, deputy chairman of the Committee on National Security and Foreign Policy in the Shura Council, said that
Saudi Arabia offered $3 billion to Lebanon in return for extraditing Majed. However, the Saudi ambassador in Lebanon reacted by saying his country was pursuing Majed, and raised questions about who had “abetted, trained, and financed Majed,” alluding to Syria and Iran.
At this time, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was venturing into a major battle in Anbar against ISIS. He wants the international anti-terror alliance to step up its measures. Meanwhile, Turkey has arrested terrorists and closed down the Bab al-Hawa crossing, but Syrian confidence in the Turkish government is nearly non-existent.
Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid bin Mohammed al-Attiyah said there is no alternative for a political solution in Syria. Jordan has been taking tougher measures at its borders, though it has yet to comply with Syrian demands. And Morocco has arrested Salafi cells bound for Syria, though its government remains opposed to Assad. Clearly, then, all these countries are complying with the US appeals to contribute in fighting terror, but they, like Washington, do not want the Syrian regime to benefit from this.
But what will Saudi Arabia do? What if it turns out that Saudis were indeed behind the Iranian embassy bombing and the attacks in Volgograd? More importantly, why has the United States not put pressure on Saudi to crackdown on takfiris?
Furthermore, will Barack Obama benefit from Saudi’s position and the Israeli desire for rapprochement with the kingdom to get an Israeli-Palestinian deal to pass? Did US Secretary of State John Kerry go from Israel to Riyadh to appease it or to put pressure on it?
The danger is growing. Kuwait has asked its citizens to leave Lebanon. The United States has made a similar request with more urgency. Other countries have done the same. This portends security developments that are more than dangerous.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
