Published Monday, February 17, 2014
The mistake that the various Lebanese parties made after the formation of the new government is that some of them saw it as a victory but they might be surprised, while others accepted it as a defeat and shocked their supporters. In reality, it is not a matter of victory or defeat. It is more like a ticking time bomb. It will either explode soon or its trigger will be defused, if the understandings reached between all the parties mature into a deal.
What are the possibilities? What happened?
First, it is no longer possible to isolate Lebanon from the regional axes that surround it. Hezbollah is part of a regional and international axis that is confident it is going to win, as the party’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said in his speech yesterday. It is not logical that Nasrallah would hand over the reigns of the government in Lebanon to his adversaries without a price. In which case, let us look for the price somewhere else, such as Syria.Second, combatting terrorism has become a priority at this stage. It is better therefore for the Interior, Justice, and Telecom ministries in Lebanon to be under the control of non-Shia officials. This facilitates the process of granting international support to the Lebanese army prior to confronting domestic terrorism. It also compels the March 14 forces to take on the responsibility of striking groups that have a welcoming, friendly milieu in certain Lebanese areas. March 14 is now bound by an international decision to combat terrorism.
Third, Lebanon might become in the future a destination for international investors in the oil sector. The Energy and Finance ministries are central to this international openness to parties allied with Hezbollah. This international success can be credited or attributed to the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and it is another victory for the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun.
Fourth, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stayed with Aoun. This is important regionally and internationally. It is important to have a minister who speaks a language close to that of March 8 and Syria even if he is not on the same ideological and aggressive level as his predecessor Adnan Mansour.
We now face several fundamental questions.
One, does the understanding reached between Aoun and former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri come with Nasrallah’s, and therefore, Iranian-Syrian support? Or did it violate the famous understanding between Aoun and Hezbollah putting the former in the international camp hostile to the party?
Logic and experience indicate that Aoun is more solid and transparent than some might believe. His loyalty led him to meet Nasrallah right before Christmas to discuss his meeting with Hariri. Nasrallah gave his blessing and told him to press ahead.
Hezbollah’s secretary general realizes that the strategic changes in the region requires defusing sectarian and any other kind of tension. He realizes too that the party’s priority at this point is not in Lebanon. The regional and international axis that it is part of is more important. Victory in Syria is the goal. The Lebanese government at this point is a mere detail.
The meeting between Aoun and Hariri happened about two months ago and was followed by another meeting between Hariri and FPM Minister Gibran Bassil a few days ago. Hezbollah was well-informed of the details of these meetings. The understanding between the FPM and Hezbollah therefore continues and the party reciprocated Aoun’s loyalty.
Two, will Iran - whose place in Lebanese politics now supersedes that of Syria - accept its allies’ defeat in the government? Or did it encourage its allies to make goodwill gestures in return for a price somewhere else? It appears that this goodwill is the very price being referred to. The Future Movement accepting to join a government with Hezbollah is important for Iran and the party. Iran reciprocated by offering Saudi Arabia a gift, namely a Lebanese government that superseded Saudi expectations. This coincided with facilitating an understanding in Yemen between the Houthis and the Hashid tribe. Where will the price be? Look in Syria.
Three, is the government meant to last? Will it be followed by a regional and international agreement on the identity of the Lebanese president? It is possible but not certain. The initial statements made by General Ashraf Rifi, MP Boutros Harb, and former President Amin Gemayel after forming the government indicate that the next phase is not going to be easy.
There are two possibilities, either the government was formed to fail right away, i.e. before the presidential elections so it will not be responsible for a presidential vacuum if it happens, or it came as a result of behind-the-scenes agreements that redraw the internal balance of power. That is possible.
Four, what if the current government is a trap? In there lies the most dangerous possibility. If the attack on Hezbollah is escalated and the bombings continue in areas where the party has a strong presence, what will the response be? It is not logical for Hezbollah to accept developments on the Lebanese scene that affect the progress of its regional axis. Full blown confrontation is possible and it is perhaps the most dangerous option if regional and international efforts to forcefully overthrow Assad and his allies continue.
Five, if the situation in the region is leaning towards reaching understandings, what is the price promised to Iran and its allies? It might be allowing Assad’s reelection. This assumes that the other side would take up the mantle of fighting terrorism. It also assumes modifications to Syria’s government to include the opposition in the coming phase. Meetings away from the limelight between Syrian opposition parties and Hezbollah suggest that in order to apply the Homs compromise in other areas. Hezbollah is now negotiating directly with Free Syrian Army and other fighters to facilitate the process of reaching understandings. That coincided with receiving the head of the opposition Syrian National Coalition, Ahmad al-Jarba, by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In short, the Lebanese government will serve as a kind of barometer for the upcoming period. The factors that might lead to its explosion are equivalent to the possibilities of its survival. True, some of its members are considered hawks but it is also true that some of them are high-level strategists and they are able to read the progress of the Iranian-Western understanding from a new perspective.
One such figure is Interior Minister Nouhad al-Machnouk. The man comes from a long political experience. Beginning from his relations with the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization and former Prime Minister Taqiuddin al-Solh to the late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in addition to his media experience and regional relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
He realizes that a sensitive ministry like the one he occupies in a volatile situation like the one that exists in Lebanon today requires wisdom, flexibility and broadening the circle of contacts. He realizes too that understanding regional developments is more important than pleasing the public or their community.
No doubt Machnouk and some of his new colleagues know that approaching the Lebanese situation from an angle other than the Western-Iranian understanding, fighting terrorism, Syrian developments, and the possibility of a later rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Syria is an adventure. They have the chance, like Hezbollah, to allow this period to pass, try to calm the situation and reach a real understanding. But like Hezbollah, they also have the chance to drive Lebanon further into the unknown.
It does not make a lot of sense to look at the government in terms of victory and defeat. It is realistic to look at it as apart of regional and international understandings that could continue or explode. Hezbollah and Iran have offered their gifts, will they be paid back? The axis comes first and Syria is a priority.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.