After a decision taken by the Saudis and the Hariri camp, the Information Branch returns to combating terrorism after a three-year hiatus. According to officials involved in this decision, cooperation with the Lebanese army and Hezbollah will be the defining feature of the next phase. The only other problem is with the CIA which has stopped sharing its high-value information with Lebanon’s Information Branch. There are efforts underway to reverse this development as Lebanese officials wait for a decision from the CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
The Internal Security Forces’ (ISF) Information Branch will resume its counter-terrorism activities. This statement by high-level Future Movement officials irritates officers at the Information Branch and officials in the ISF, who insist that they never stopped pursuing terrorist networks. In their official statements, they confidently talk about their achievements in the past few years. But further scrutiny of the branch’s performance in the past three years reveals that it did not make a significant effort to combat terrorism, except on the information level.
Since 2011, the Information Branch’s work has been driven by a clear policy on Syria that can be summarized as follows: “We will not stop anyone from smuggling weapons into Syria, we will not bother anyone who recruits people to fight in Syria, and we will not hesitate to help Syrian rebels where we must.”
Western diplomats, some of whom work in the intelligence field, affirm that the former head of the Information Branch, Brigadier General Wissam al-Hassan, “was involved in smuggling arms shipments from Lebanon to Syria.” This information was also reported in The Economist last year. Others talk about his role in arming Syrian opposition groups through Turkish territory as well.
According to Lebanese diplomats and politicians, it is true that the United States is helping Syrian rebels, but it is opposed to arming groups if the weapons are going to end up in the hands of terrorists.
These arming operations were not continued by Colonel Imad Othman who succeeded Hassan after his assassination. But he did follow in his predecessor’s footsteps in meetings with Western officials, and specifically US officials. When Hassan and Othman would discuss the situation in Syria, they would engage in a lot of propaganda. According to Western officials: “They were willing to hide a lot of facts about the strength and danger of al-Qaeda so as not to harm the rebels’ image.”
Its field (arming) activities and its exchange of information with Westerners made the US abstain from providing the Information Branch with any serious information about the movement of al-Qaeda-affiliated individuals in Lebanon.
Lebanese security services arrested Shadi al-Mawlawi in Tripoli based on information from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Lebanese army also arrested the leader of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, Majed al-Majed, and Naim Abbas based on information from the CIA.
When it comes to security issues that are serious or highly-sensitive, the CIA deprives its ally - the Information Branch - of any information it has. It is no longer a matter of speculation. US diplomats and security officials informed Lebanese politicians and security officials of this decision. Oftentimes the US did not provide justification for this decision, claiming instead that the agency wants to cooperate with the oldest security agency in Lebanon, the army intelligence.
But some US intelligence officials did give the reason in confidentiality: “The arming operations in Syria that individuals and the leadership of the Information Branch have already been involved in do not inspire confidence, as these officials put their political affiliation ahead of combating terrorism.”
“But the priorities of the Information Branch have changed. Combating terrorism has become their top priority,” say officials involved with the branch’s work. They add that the consequences of this decision “will become evident but they need some time.” Surely, this decision is not the brainchild of Colonel Othman but rather comes from the Saudi-Future Movement political camp to which he belongs to.
According to political sources involved with the work of the Information Branch, the main priority in the coming period is “cooperation between the army intelligence and the Information Branch.” That is why, Interior Minister Nouhad al-Machnouk called for cooperation to close - what he termed - the “death crossings” between Lebanon and Syria that are being used to smuggle stolen cars from Lebanon into Syria through the town of Britel in the Bekaa before these cars return to Lebanon through Arsal.
Security sources in the Bekaa indicate that the most important stolen cars dealer has disappeared and stopped selling cars to the Syrian opposition in the Qalamoun region more than three months ago. But security sources in Beirut confirm that security forces will go after the man and other dealers who work in stolen cars and counterfeit their documents.
This, according to sources, will occur through coordination between the army, the Information Branch and Hezbollah, pointing out that Othman has been instructed to overcome the “psychological and political barriers” that sometimes impede coordination with the party. The sources confirm that security measures will not be restricted to car thieves but will surely include the Arsal group that helps the terrorists based in Qalamoun to carry out bombings in Lebanon. Members of this group will either have to flee from Arsal, face prison time, or die.
The sources confirm that the Future Movement has provided the political cover to go after the Arsal group. A political-security discussion will take place between Hezbollah and the Future Movement paving the way for counter-terrorism operations that target groups supporting it directly or indirectly in the northern Bekaa.
There is still the problem of being deprived of information from the US, which is “vital for combating terrorism,” according to security officials. They point out that a serious discussion is underway between Lebanese and US officials to persuade the CIA to change its decision. The US side has promised to work on the issue but no one can guarantee the CIA’s cooperation.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.