Published Saturday, April 19, 2014
We will not have another presidential election like this one. Since 1990, people have hoped that a strong president would return to the Baabda presidential palace to create a balance between Christian, Sunni, and Shia influence in the government.
A strong president does not mean someone with a track record of crimes or someone who has mastered the art of sectarian incitement, or someone who oversaw official institutions being stripped of all their credentials during their six-year term. Rather, a strong president is someone who has a political career established in the army leadership before it became what it is today. Someone who won the support of 70 percent of the Christian population, who has a 27-member parliamentary bloc, who had 10 ministers in a previous cabinet and who participates in leading his political alliance instead of being led. I am talking here about Michel Aoun specifically. Aoun’s candidacy was not likely in previous elections but rarely has a presidential election come by without people thinking of a time when a president would occupy that post instead of merely being assigned to Baabda.
Some candidates are wealthy, others are intellectuals, and others are cartoonish, traditional, or power hungry. But they are all average. Dozens like them will come and go without anyone noticing. For the first time however, and most probably the last, Aoun will be a presidential candidate. Some might ask why would we bet on Aoun to build the republic when he failed at building a small political party. And how will he be trusted with the system of consensual democracy in the country when he does not believe in democracy in his political household. Dozens of questions can be asked, but more important than all these questions is that this is the last time that Christians will have a strong candidate for president.
Aoun does not derive his strength from his past only, but from his ability to restore balance to the government in the future. All the rumors about Aoun reassuring Hezbollah in order to proceed with a serious dialogue about the defense strategy are nothing but details. And so are the rumors about Aoun’s guarantees to US oil corporations. The most important item on Aoun’s presidential agenda is restoring balance in the government.
A source close to Aoun explains that the regional balance today prevents the Sunni sect from retaining a bigger and more important role in the government than the Shia role. The regional balance itself makes it impossible to convene a new Taif Agreement that would divide the government in a clear way between Sunnis and Shias. Herein lies the importance of Aoun’s role. He is able to ask the Future Movement to give back to the Christian community what was originally theirs. What the Future Movement gives up will not be interpreted as a defeat for the Sunni community and a victory for the Shia. That is how the regional balance would translate domestically without anyone feeling as though they won or lost, and Lebanon’s fragile stability would be maintained as the international community hopes.
This is not only Aoun’s last chance, it is the Taif Agreement’s last chance. Nothing suggests that anyone else has Aoun’s political experience or popular political representation. Aoun has an amazing network of relationships and the trust of his allies and party members. A US diplomat was not joking when he told a Lebanese friend a few days ago: “We are facing a clear equation, either Michel Aoun or chaos.”
Aoun does not want car convoys and rallies chanting his name. He does not want radio ads or a lobby that puts his friends’ capabilities at the service of his presidential campaign. He is adamant that his front-line would consist of him only. Behind Aoun comes Foreign Affairs Minister Gebran Bassil and there is nobody behind them. The others will lose if Aoun loses but without having the honor of fighting. Friends can talk positively about him, the media can do what its deems fit and his supporters can pray and light candles for him. He will not ask for any of that. He could care less about making appearances or exaggerating his chances. He adheres, this time more than anytime before, to the idea that he is a one-man machine.
According to his visitors, Aoun always deals with the presidential elections with a lucid mind, distinguishing between reality and dreams. If a guest asks him about an article or a piece of news or a new candidate, Aoun urges him not to be distracted by these games. A few months ago, he decided not to waste time in small battles and absurd enmities that distract him and hinder his progress. For example, why would he antagonize the president? He knows now that the president is not made in Lebanon and it is not a personal decision taken by Hariri or the Future Movement. It is the result of a US-Iranian understanding or a clash preceded by US-Saudi-Iranian-Syrian consultations.
He has no illusions that Hariri - irrespective of their personal relationship - will fight his presidential battle for him. His personal overtures to Hariri were meant to guarantee that Hariri would welcome Aoun’s election if an international agreement is reached around him instead of being resentful and mobilizing his relations to undermine his chances. His relationship with Hariri’s advisor, former MP Ghattas Khoury, has become very strong and he speaks with admiration of Nader Hariri. He was happy that Hariri and Interior Minister Nouhad al-Machnouk invited themselves to visit Bassil. They asked: “When do we have dinner at your place?” The relationship between them is getting stronger but Aoun will not be Hariri’s candidate. The Saudi embassy has not asked for an appointment to hand Aoun an invitation from the Saudi king to visit the kingdom.
Aoun is walking a tightrope between the US and Iran, one wrong step and he will fall. He knows that appearing like the candidate who can restore balance to the government is one of his strongest traits but it is also his weakness in the eyes of those who believe that restoring balance means confiscating some of their gains.
What has been reported about conversations with Aoun indicates that one reason he insists on fighting his battle alone is that he knows that he will not get a conclusive answer from the US now or in the future. Getting carried away in exaggerating America’s positive attitude and making it seem like a final endorsement will prompt the US embassy in Beirut to issue a statement denying such claims and to move in the opposite direction. He does not meet the US Ambassador David Hill as much as the media claims, although Hill has a good relationship with Bassil. The text messages between them are reminiscent of the text messages between former US Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman and March 14 figures.
Aoun knows that the civilized nature of US interests drives them to make rational, instead of emotional decisions, which makes his job easier. The priority of domestic stability for them prompted the formation of the new government, even if it meant Hezbollah’s participation. Their priority of fighting terrorism drove them to fight alongside Hezbollah. How would they feel then If Aoun’s election guarantees these two priorities and more?
Aoun is worried that constant gossip and MP rivalries might adversely affect his relationship with Speaker of the House Nabih Berri. This time, he will not be satisfied with counting on Hezbollah’s pressure on Berri as he did in the past and will reach out to him personally.
As for Walid Jumblatt, Aoun asks, what would reassure him that his election would not interfere with his leadership or undermine his role as the deciding factor in Lebanese politics. Away from the rumors circulating, Aoun is trying make a deal with Jumblatt that would give the Interior Ministry to him or possibly to his son.
Anyone who knows Aoun well knows that contrary to appearances, he does not like to appease anyone. But he has to do all this and more. He entered Lebanese history when he rejected the US-Syrian production of the Lebanese president calling on the Lebanese people to have their say. Here he is today admitting that the Lebanese are not capable of producing a president, as he waits for the US approval of his election.
He is far from being a consensus figure but he refuses to talk about what would follow May 24 and acts as though his political future is subject to the approval of regional power players. But if he is elected, his loss in terms of being forced to join the game that he tried so hard to destroy is incomparable to the loss of all those who banded together to destroy him. And here they are, recognizing his popular and political legitimacy and declaring him president.
The presidency in the scope of the Iranian-Saudi understanding
Aoun is not the only one counting on an Iranian-Saudi rapprochement that would allow him to win the presidency. Both General Jean Kahwaji, commander of the armed forces, and MP Jean Obeid are also counting on an Iranian-Saudi understanding. Insiders say that their probability of being elected is tied to the nature and size of this rapprochement.
If Iran and Saudi Arabia reach an agreement that is comprehensive and their goal is restoring balance to the Lebanese government based on a new version of the no winners and no losers formula, and allowing for a state of stability that would allow the Lebanese to begin extracting their oil, then Aoun would be the primary candidate.
If the understanding is limited to certain issues, such as the war on terrorism, then Kahwaji would be the candidate. Aoun’s veto against Kahwaji still stands but it is not clear if it will affect Hezbollah’s position. Keep in mind that Hezbollah placated Kahwaji at Aoun’s expense at prior important junctures, not the other way around.
If the Saudi-Iranian agreement ends in a negative understanding that tries to cool down the dispute without solving it given Iran’s clear superiority, in the hope that the balance of power would tip a little bit in the future, Obeid would be the first candidate. Perhaps former Interior Minister Ziad Baroud would be Obeid’s only competitor at this point relying on the support of the Maronite Patriarchate domestically and the influence of French diplomacy with the Saudis. If they settle on Obeid, no Lebanese party would win over another. If they go with Baroud then it would be a kind of renewal of Michel Suleiman’s term.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.