If reaching a national reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas was so easy that it could be done in less than 24 hours, which is what happened this week, why have these two parties failed to do so for the past seven years?
Paris: Why did the numerous meetings, discussions, and Arab mediation efforts over the past few years fail to bridge the divide between Fatah and Hamas, while a fleeting visit by a delegation representing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), sent by Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas to the Gaza Strip, was able to do so without any mediation?
Why did the 2011 Cairo Agreement and the 2012 Doha Declaration fail at a time when the proclaimed reconciliation is being accomplished today based on the terms of the two previous agreements?
Why did both sides encumber the Palestinian people with the burden of their dispute all this time if they were able to put an end to it? The more important and vital question is, if the dispute between Fatah and Hamas was a result of their clashing national programs and political visions, as they claim, does that mean that they finally managed to formulate a common national program?
The national reconciliation agreement that was announced clearly postulates the formation of a technocratic government made up of qualified figures in five weeks, having legislative and presidential elections after six months and renewing PLO institutions to pave the way for Hamas to join the organization.
This raises an obvious question about the common national program that will be presented to the Palestinians first and the international community second.
Have the fundamental differences between a party that sees peace as the only path to reach a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and another that believes in resistance in all its forms as a path to liberate historic Palestine been resolved? Or did one side succumb to the other’s strategy?
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| Modern Palestine Flaq |
The statements issued by both sides indicate that the reconciliation agreement recognizes the Oslo Accords as the framework of the PA, which will renew its institutions through elections. Fatah leader, Azzam al-Ahmed stated very clearly: “We as Palestinians unanimously accept an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, solving the problem of the refugees, full sovereignty over all our territory, and no recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.” Saeb Erekat preceded Ahmed stressing that “reconciliation is necessary to achieve peace.” Abbas himself did not miss the chance to assert that “there is no contradiction between reconciliation and negotiations.”
Hamas leaders on the other hand spoke in general terms. Member of the Hamas political bureau, Moussa Abu Marzouk, said: “The Palestinian people are the main supporters and sponsors of ending the division,” emphasizing that “the occupation is the sole beneficiary of Palestinian fragmentation.” He did not deny that implementing this agreement will face a lot of difficulties but he insisted on the necessity to “shake the dust and turn a new page by uniting and going forward towards reconciliation.”But Abu Marzouk needs to tell us how is it possible to go forward if his political party does not answer the questions that were posed in 2006? What if the international community imposed its previous conditions on Hamas? What is his response to what Ahmed said about Palestinian unanimity regarding the two-state solution? Does he agree with Erekat that reconciliation is the way to peace?
The clarity with which Fatah leaders confirmed their traditional positions while Hamas leaders were evasive in responding to them clearly indicates that Hamas is the weakest link in this reconciliation.
Even though Abbas resorted to the reconciliation as a maneuver after failing to procure the bare minimum of his demands from Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, Hamas was forced into it after losing the Muslim Brotherhood - its primary source of support - and losing Syria and Iran as allies without gaining Qatar.This means that both sides resorted to the so-called national reconciliation to improve their political positions and not because it is going to serve the Palestinian cause as they made it out to be. It is absolutely impossible to serve this cause in the absence of a clear and specific agreement on the nature of core national principles and how they can be achieved, whether through resistance, negotiations or a compromise between the two. The interest of the Palestinian cause can not be achieved given that one of the parties has been mired in futile negotiations for 20 years and another party fluctuates in its position depending on the regional and international circumstances whereby it calls for resistance but hesitates to practice it since 2006.
The reconciliation that they are touting confirms once again that the PA as an institution with the Oslo Accords as its frame of reference has become a point of consensus between all the parties. They disagree on their share but they do not disagree about it, otherwise, what is the point of Hamas returning to this authority through new elections after trying this path before, which has proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that maneuvering from within this institution is an impossible task? If it justified its participation in the 2006 elections by the death of the Oslo Accords during the second Intifada, what is their justification this time?
How can Abbas threaten to hand over the keys of this authority at a time when he will call on the Palestinian people tomorrow to renew its legitimacy?
Had Abbas been serious about his threat, he would have used the national reconciliation agreement as an opportunity to call on all the Palestinian parties to embark on an open national workshop aimed at formulating scenarios and alternatives for the post-PA era.
If Hamas still adheres to the idea of historic Palestine, it would have refused to go through reconciliation on the basis of elections governed by the Oslo Accords.
But having all these questions lingering without answers, especially from Hamas, indicates that what happened in the Gaza Strip yesterday is nothing but a show, a form of political adolescence and hypocrisy practiced by the leaders of both sides against the Palestinian people. It is also a matter of divvying up interests and not ending the split. But even if we agree that this reconciliation truly ends the division, then it is doubtlessly at the expense of the Palestinian cause and its core principles.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
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