A picture taken on 12 April 2013 in Beirut shows a giant banner protecting a construction site in an area of the city center that was destroyed during the 15-year Lebanese civil war. (Photo: AFP - Joseph Eid)
One of the main challenges facing the re-foundation of the Lebanese state is finding general outlines to govern its foreign policies. Politicians and analysts do not tire of repeating phrases such as, “there is no local solution as long as the regional arena is tense and divided.” They all acknowledge that the Lebanese state lacks the ability and even the will to draw a foreign policy.
The inability or lack of inclination to adopt such policies is sometimes obvious and other times hidden, but it always leads to the lack of actual inclusion of all sides in the Lebanese social and political arrangement, under the ceiling of the state. However, to assume that sects posses external positions, interests, and influences, should not hide the fact that these external connections and dependencies are actually meant to bolster their fragile internal positions.
The situation leads to a circular relationship, whereby internal sectarian forces use their external connections and alliances as a leverage, which prevents the elaboration of an external (or even internal) state policy.
In functional terms, foreign policy does not exist in isolation of the state’s internal choices. Foreign policy is the translation of internal choices and their extension into the state’s external relations.
One Foreign Policy?
The word sect, as defined by Ibn Khaldun (and in the linguistic sense), does not have any organic links to religion or confession. Sects are socio-political formations linked by communal bonds and fed by kinship and marriage. While it became connected with religious confessions in Lebanon, the word sect also includes tribes and clans.
Looking at the areas where sects appear, it is easy to notice that they are mountainous or desert regions that do not have apparent value for the state and did not impose any threat to the military or trade routes. The cost of controlling those sects became bigger than the benefits of this control.
Therefore, sects do not have the capacity to create their own foreign policies, unless they turn into states and stop being sectarian.
Having a foreign policy is a component of state formation. In this context, the policy of “disengagement” could be considered as a threat to the foundations and the rationale behind the existence of the state. The state is founded on the reinforcement of the position of the community it represents against foreign influence. Agreement on an integral and unified foreign policy is a constituent and not a temporary feature of the state.
Ultimately, any country can close its borders and isolate itself. However, this choice has consequences. In the context of the logic of the state, it can determine the terms of its relations and attempt to enhance them.
In Lebanon, for example, the economic model is based on Lebanese working abroad and spending their remittances in their home country. This model, as bad as it is, supports integrated relations in the region.
Charbel Nahas is an economist and the former telecommunications and labor minister of Lebanon.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
The inability or lack of inclination to adopt such policies is sometimes obvious and other times hidden, but it always leads to the lack of actual inclusion of all sides in the Lebanese social and political arrangement, under the ceiling of the state. However, to assume that sects posses external positions, interests, and influences, should not hide the fact that these external connections and dependencies are actually meant to bolster their fragile internal positions.
The situation leads to a circular relationship, whereby internal sectarian forces use their external connections and alliances as a leverage, which prevents the elaboration of an external (or even internal) state policy.
In functional terms, foreign policy does not exist in isolation of the state’s internal choices. Foreign policy is the translation of internal choices and their extension into the state’s external relations.
One Foreign Policy?
The word sect, as defined by Ibn Khaldun (and in the linguistic sense), does not have any organic links to religion or confession. Sects are socio-political formations linked by communal bonds and fed by kinship and marriage. While it became connected with religious confessions in Lebanon, the word sect also includes tribes and clans.
Looking at the areas where sects appear, it is easy to notice that they are mountainous or desert regions that do not have apparent value for the state and did not impose any threat to the military or trade routes. The cost of controlling those sects became bigger than the benefits of this control.
Therefore, sects do not have the capacity to create their own foreign policies, unless they turn into states and stop being sectarian.
Having a foreign policy is a component of state formation. In this context, the policy of “disengagement” could be considered as a threat to the foundations and the rationale behind the existence of the state. The state is founded on the reinforcement of the position of the community it represents against foreign influence. Agreement on an integral and unified foreign policy is a constituent and not a temporary feature of the state.
Ultimately, any country can close its borders and isolate itself. However, this choice has consequences. In the context of the logic of the state, it can determine the terms of its relations and attempt to enhance them.
In Lebanon, for example, the economic model is based on Lebanese working abroad and spending their remittances in their home country. This model, as bad as it is, supports integrated relations in the region.
Charbel Nahas is an economist and the former telecommunications and labor minister of Lebanon.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.