| Israa Al-Fass Media intimidation and exaggeration in talking about battles in which Hezbollah is involved in Syria, as well as the numbers of the fallen martyrs and the killed insurgents among the opposition groups, raised the following questions: Is Hezbollah really fighting in Syria? And why?... under which title? Do the combats have a sectarian trend that dragged the resistance, often warning of sedition?  These questions are legitimate amid the good reputation promoted by the party along many years; the reputation which allowed Hezbollah to overturn the equation and impose its power in the face of the Israeli occupation, amid a vehement media campaign where the subject of Hezbollah’s “fighting” dominates many of media headlines. The two-year old tireless media agitation finds easy giving the struggle a sectarian trend.Some media outlets say the party sends fighters under the pretext of protecting holy sites, which eventually trapped it into sedition. They also allege that the battle, with Hezbollah’s involvement, took a Sunni-Shiite trend. Then, what do the non-abettors see? Hezbollah’s history, as its Secretary General stated in his latest speech, could answer every single raised question. Hezbollah that warns repeatedly from sectarian sedition didn’t announce the holy jihad when the Iraqi holy sites were vandalized and the shrines of the Infallible Imams were blasted. The resistance party didn’t support the Bahraini demands which surpassed the limit of calling for political reforms but called for “ousting the king” after the authorities had damaged more than 30 Shiite mosques and ruined dozens of houses of worship, not to mention burning some copies of the Holy Quran. During each event mentioned above, Hezbollah repeated its warning of sedition, understanding in each time the emotional status of the Shiite people, and stressing that sanctities doesn’t not belong to one Muslim sect, and that the “greatest jihad” compass spins toward another place, i.e. the Zionist occupation. Hezbollah’s policy didn’t change, exactly like people’s emotions toward their sanctities. But the struggle in Syria has another trend noticed by everybody, except those who were taken far away by the well-known goals of the media propaganda. Hezbollah, showing understand to the reformative demands since the beginning of the crisis in Syria, and proffering an initiative with other allies to blow off the steam, did notice another trend of the ongoing events. The party warned from moving within the stream, talked about a conspiracy targeting Syria and its role in the region, as well as regimes reckoning against the Syrian regime for the support with which it provided the resistance movement. It also noticed a targeting operation for an entire axis in which the party is considered a main pillar. Hezbollah stresses that the struggle in Syria has an international trend related to the choices adopted by the regime on the level of resistance and reluctance. Thus, it considers itself the following target. Perhaps the civilians kidnapped from Azaz contributed to boosting Hezbollah’s vision and deepening it among its followers. The sectarian affiliation, according to the public, became an excuse for targeting and extorting in the bazaar of international struggle with the resistance, whose tools are some militants related to intelligence apparatuses of some countries that significantly contributed to escalating the crisis without denouncing the crime of kidnapping civilians by those who supported the “Syrian revolution” for it “calls for freedom.” Today, it is widely assured that any success in the dissociation operation of the axis of resistance on the military level, by toppling the Syrian regime, won’t exclude Hezbollah and some other sides, especially after some previous diplomatic efforts to exclude Syria from this axis didn’t bear fruits. Hezbollah’s followers are aware the battles trends and its background. This is represented by the popular consent about the death of Hezbollah’s martyrs who fought off military operations that targeted their villages and properties on the borderline. They willed to engage in those battles, as in the past, to protect their lands and properties after the government decided to self-distance itself from performing this duty. Within the media propaganda that invents news to result in interactions, Hezbollah and its followers are paying the costs of their mindful reading of what is in between the lines and behind the scene. Self-defense, with respect to the propaganda’s standards, is now “fighting” and a “war crime.” Perhaps among the results of this propaganda, those who denounced yesterday “the Iraqi democracy imposed by the American tank” will be the same to send for it but this time to Syria. The tank of the “democracy-sponsoring administration” in the region is the same one that refused to recognize a government that resulted from a popular will in the Gaza strip in 2006, only because it is a resistant government! Translated by Zeinab Abdallah To read the original version in Arabic click here | ||||
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Why Hezbollah ’Is Fighting’ in Syria?
A picture of Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is seen in Bekaa Valley, Oct. 17, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir)
By: Ali Hashem for Al-Monitor Posted on April 21. |
Why is Hezbollah fighting in Syria? Why did such a popular resistance group decide to risk its reputation around the Arab world and open a new front in order to back Syria's President Bashar al-Assad? Assad, who himself does not know if he can keep his chair for another year or not. What made Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who is famous for his stances that repeatedly warned of the Fitna — the Arabic word for sectarian confrontation — meddle in the Syrian mud?
Hezbollah has its own answers for all these questions, but prefers not to discuss them in the media. According to circles close to the organization, Hezbollah's involvement in Syria wasn't a choice, but rather an obligation. Those sources say that in the very beginning of the Syrian uprising, the group's charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah "tried to initiate a solution." He, and other factions such as Hamas, opened a hotline with the Syrian leadership to make sure "Syria as a nation, people, and a political choice could survive the crisis." This was the first level of involvement that saw Nasrallah "mediating with Assad to release political prisoners, announce reforms, and change the mentality of the Mukhabarat, or intelligence members." One of our sources even revealed that in August 2011, Iranian foreign ministry official Hussein Sheikh al-Islam visited Damascus and handed the president a list of "125 remarks on the way the Syrian regime was dealing with the crisis, [which] were all negative remarks."
At that time it was already obvious that armed militiamen were crossing the borders from Lebanon into Syria, a fact proved by eyewitness accounts and journalists covering the border separating both countries. "Hezbollah wanted this crisis to end; to him Syria as a whole means the backyard of the resistance," said our source. He added, "Hezbollah knew the regime was outdated, and that people needed a change, especially after the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, though they thought the change should be made within the regime, not by overthrowing it."
"Bashar al-Assad's regime helped the resistance when everyone was plotting conspiracies against it. In the 2006 war he opened his borders for weapons, and they even gave Hezbollah some strategic missiles." This is the rhetoric Hezbollah used and continues to use to defend its stance and position on the side of Assad regime. "Hezbollah believes that the whole war on Bashar al-Assad is because of his backing of the resistance—Hezbollah and Hamas in specific," said our source, who accuses Hamas of betraying those who fed and hosted them. "They didn't even think of taking a position in the middle; they went to the extreme, leaving Damascus to Qatar, and sending their members to Syria to fight the Assad regime with the weapons he, Iran, and Hezbollah smuggled to Gaza." Hamas continues to deny these claims, saying that they have no members fighting in Syria, though it was revealed in December 2012 that a senior Hamas trainer Mohammed Konayta was killed in Idlib while taking part in an attack on a military base.
According to the source, Hezbollah decided to intervene militarily in the wake of three incidents. "The first was a full scale attack by Syrian rebels on Shiite villages on the borders with Lebanon, forcing people there to flee to Lebanon. The second was the attack on Sayyida Zaynab neighborhood in Damascus that embraces the tomb of Prophet Mohammed's granddaughter Zaynab, and the third an attack by Syrian rebels on a Hezbollah armed convoy that was on its way to Lebanon."
According to the source, Hezbollah decided to intervene militarily in the wake of three incidents. "The first was a full scale attack by Syrian rebels on Shiite villages on the borders with Lebanon, forcing people there to flee to Lebanon. The second was the attack on Sayyida Zaynab neighborhood in Damascus that embraces the tomb of Prophet Mohammed's granddaughter Zaynab, and the third an attack by Syrian rebels on a Hezbollah armed convoy that was on its way to Lebanon."
After these three incidents, our source believes, Hezbollah took the decision to give arms to Shiite villagers on the borders and help them defend their villages—a step that was followed by deploying troops from the same area to make sure the villages were safe and kept away from Syrian rebels. As for the Sayyida Zaynab shrine, in southern Damascus, Hezbollah's role was more planning than implementing. A group of Hezbollah military strategists drew plans for defending the holy site to make sure it wouldn't be destroyed by Salafist fighters. On this point, our source elaborates: "Hezbollah knows that fighting in Syria is a big decision that might cost them a lot of lives, but they knew too that if the shrine ... the cost will be very expensive, and it will be paid wherever there are mixed populations of Sunnis and Shiites. Then we will witness the real Fitna. Hezbollah can't control angry Shiites who will seek revenge."
When the Sayyida Zaynab neighborhood was attacked, religious Shiites from around the world asked both Hezbollah and Iran to intervene. Hundreds of Iraqi Shiites rushed to Syria to defend the shrine. Even clerics who opposed Hezbollah urged them to do something to avoid seeing the sacred Shiite site destroyed, keeping in mind the famous attack on Iraq's Sameraa city that saw a shrine of two of Shiite imams turned into rubble. "Hezbollah wasn't waiting for anyone to urge them to act. They knew what to do, and the decision was made to defend the shrine, whatever the cost," says our source, adding, "Hezbollah is not like any other organization. When the Shura council agrees on a decision, everyone will have to bow to it. Even if there were some who had objections, whenever the decision is made they will defend it."
Today, as tens of Hezbollah fighters are announced by the party as "martyrs of the Jihad duty," funerals are taking place across Lebanon from Bekaa to the south. "Hezbollah is announcing on Manar TV and Nour Radio, on websites and each media outlet they have access to, about their martyrs. They don't do it secretly. See the Facebook pages and how pro-Hezbollah activists are celebrating the martyrdom of these guys. Any claims of dismay within ranks or families is propaganda by anti-Hezbollah journalists and media outlets," said our source, who also offered to put me in contact with families of some of the Hezbollah men killed in Syria.
I called one of them on the phone, a father of a 23-year-old man who was shot dead near the Sayyida Zaynab shrine. He preferred not to give his name, as Hezbollah hadn't given him approval to talk to the media. I asked him about his son's death and how he felt about it. "I'm sad," he said. "Very sad. My son isn't here anymore. We lost him, but at least we know he is in heaven with Prophet Mohammed and the imams. He was defending their daughter." His final words to me were, "if the war against Israel was similar to Prophet Mohammed's Bader war against his enemies, this war is just another version of Imam Hussein's Karbala. We won't be defeated."
Read more:
The Reasons Behind Hezbollah’s Decision to Fight in Syria
لهذه الإسباب «أُجبر» حزب الله على التدخل في العمليّات العسكريّة في سوريا
أوقات الشام
ابراهيم ناصر الدين
الحملة المنظمة على حزب الله في الايام القليلة الماضية من بوابة تدخله في الازمة السورية، ليست عبثية وهي تدار من قبل فريق عمل سياسي داخلي وخارجي يحاول استغلال محطات مفصلية في الازمة السورية على أمل الاستفادة منها لتهشيم صورة الحزب ومحاصرته عبر وضعه في خانة واحدة مع التنظيمات الارهابية التي تقاتل في سوريا، وفي هذا السياق يتلقف السياسيون ووسائل الاعلام المتخصصة بتشويه صورة الحزب تصعيد المجموعات المسلحة اعلاميا وميدانيا على الجبهة اللبنانية من خلال الاعلان عن نقل «معركة الدم» الى لبنان، لرفع الصوت عاليا والتحذير من المخاطر التي يستجلبها الحزب على لبنان، اما المواكبة الخارجية لهذه الحملة فتبلغ ذروتها اليوم بوضع ملف تدخل الحزب في النزاع القائم في سوريا، على طاولة وزراء خارجية الاتحاد الاوروبي في بروكسل، فيما اعيد نبش ملفات قديمة جديدة للحزب على وقع الهجمات الارهابية في بوسطن.
اوساط سياسية متابعة لهذا الملف تشير الى ان هذا «العبث» الاعلامي والسياسي لم يعد يعني حزب الله بشيء خصوصا ان الاحداث والتطورات في المنطقة وخصوصا في سوريا قد تجاوزت بالوقائع الموجودة على الارض كل «الترهات»التي تتحدث عن ثورة يقوم بها الشعب السوري ضد النظام، وباتت «اللعبة» مكشوفة امام الجميع ولم يعد خافيا على احد طبيعة الصراع الدولي والاقليمي الذي يخاض بالوكالة على الساحة السورية، ولذلك فان من يخوض غمار هذه الحملة على حزب الله من خلال البحث الدؤوب عن دلائل تشير الى «تورطه» بالازمة السورية يضيّع وقته، لان السؤال المطروح اليوم ليس عما اذا كان حزب الله «متورط» بالازمة السورية، فهذا الامر بديهي، ولو كانت النوايا صافية لكان السؤال المركزي هو لماذا اجبر الحزب على القتال في بعض المناطق السورية؟.
الاجابة على هذا السؤال تقتضي التذكير على حدّ قول الأوساط بان حزب الله لا يخفي ولا يخجل ولا يمل من التذكير بتحالفه الاستراتيجي مع الدولة السورية، وهو يعتبر ان النظام يخوض هناك معركة «حياة او موت» بالنيابة عن محور المقاومة الذي لن يبخل بأي جهد لمساعدة النظام على الصمود والانتصار بالحرب التي باتت علنية ودون مواربة من احد،هذا الموقف الاستراتيجي الذي لم يتغير منذ اليوم الاول للازمة، لم يترافق مع اي محاولة للتدخل، وعلى العكس من ذلك لعب الحزب دورا بناء في محاولة التأثير على القيادة السورية لفتح ابواب الحوار مع بعض القوى المعارضة، وأضطر الامين العام للحزب السيد حسن نصرالله الى زيارة دمشق اكثر من مرة التقى خلالها الرئيس بشار الاسد، وقد لاقت تلك النصائح قبولا لدى القيادة السورية التي كانت مقتنعة بتلك الاجراءات، وهو ماجرى ترجمته الى افعال اصلاحية في وقت لاحق، ولكن مجريات الاحداث قطعت الشك باليقين ووصلت قيادة الحزب الى قناعة مفادها ان القرار باسقاط النظام السوري قد اخذ من قبل قوى اقليمية ودولية لن تتراجع عن قراراها بغض النظر عن اي اصلاحات يقوم بها الرئيس السوري.
وتلفت تلك الاوساط الى ان من يلوم الحزب على موقفه، ينسى، او يتقصد التعمية على مسؤولية «المعارضة السورية» التي كانت سباقة في اشهار العداء لحزب الله، ولا تلتفت الى مسؤوليتها عن اثارة المخاوف لديه، فهي بشقيها العلماني والاسلامي تنافست وتسابقت على ارضاء الرعاة الخارجيين، فكان التصريح الشهير لرئيس الائتلاف الوطني المعارض برهان غليون الذي قال صراحة ان العلاقة مع حزب الله وايران لن تعود الى سابق عهدها عندما تنتصر المعارضة، اما «الثورة» التي يقودها الاسلاميون فتبنت شعارها الشهير «المسيحي الى بيروت والعلوي الى التابوت»، وهنا كانت الاشارات العملية الاولى الدالة على طبيعة المعركة الدائرة على الارض والتي تخللها سلسلة مجازر ذات طابع مذهبي، وتوجت اخيرا بأعتراف «جبهة النصرة» «بأبوة» تنظيم القاعدة.
هذا المعطى الجديد كانت له ترجمة عملية على الارض، تقول الاوساط اذ بات على الحدود المتاخمة للقرى اللبنانية مجموعات «تكفيرية» يفتي «امراؤها» بقتل الشيعة لأسباب عقائدية جاهلية وهي تكفر المذهب الجعفري وتستبيح اعراضه وامواله، وبات من يسيطر على الارض الكتائب الإسلامية الجهادية، وابرزها جبهة النصرة، وأحرار الشام، ومجلس شورى المجاهدين، وأنصار الشريعة، وكتائب البتار، ولواء الفجر،وكل هذه المجموعات تعتمد على العناصر الأجنبية في هيكلها سواء مقاتلين أو شرعيين ورجال دين أو خبراء وتقنيين ومنظرين سياسيين. فما هو الموقف المطلوب من حزب الله؟ وكيف يريد المزايدون على مواقفه ان يتعامل مع تحول سورية الى أكبر منطقة استقطاب للسلفيين الجهاديين بعد أفغانستان،في ظل تدفق آلاف المقاتلين العرب والمتطوعين الأوروبيين والقوقازيين.
وكيف يمكن التسويق بعد لنظرية وقوف حزب الله في مواجهة طموحات الشعب السوري في الحرية؟ اذا كانت القيادات السلفية قد اقرت علنا بأن الشريان المغذي «للنصرة» بعد السوريين، هم الأردنيون يليهم الخليجيون، ثم العراقيون والمغاربة، وعددهم يقارب 3000مقاتل، اغلبهم قاتلوا في مناطق مثل العراق وأفغانستان والشيشان وليبيا. اما القسم المغمور منهم، فيعتمد عليهم في العمليات الاستشهادية وغالبيتهم من المغرب العربي والسعودية والكويت والأردن وليبيا وتونس التي تدفق منها الكثير من أنصار التيار السلفي الجهادي، أما القسم الأجنبي فهو ليس قليلاً داخل تلك التيارات وخصوصاً جبهة النصرة. وللمقاتلين من مناطق القوقاز فلهم النصيب الأكبر من الحظوة ولهم سمعة قوية في العمل العسكري، حيث يبرع هؤلاء المقاتلون في حرب الشوارع والقنص. وكذلك يوجد مقاتلون من أوكرانيا ومن البوسنة ومقاتلون وأطباء من فرنسا وبريطانيا وهولندا من أصول مغاربية.
وتسأل تلك الاوساط عما اذا كانت هذه الوقائع الموثقة تحتاج الى بذل الجهد للاجابة عن الاسباب الكامنة وراء مشاركة حزب الله في الحرب الدائرة في سوريا؟ وتلفت الى ازدواجية معايير جديدة يعتمدها اصحاب الحملة المنظمة على الحزب، حين يبررون لدول جوار سوريا قلقها من قيام «امارة» اسلامية متطرفة في سوريا، ويروجون للمخاوف الاميركية من الارهاب، بينما يتم التصويب والتركيز على تشويه صورة الحزب والتقليل من المخاطر الجدية التي يتحدث عنها، ويقوم اليوم بعملية استباقية لمنع قيامها على الحدود المتاخمة للبنان.
هذه الحرب الاستباقية هي «بيت القصيد» في تدخل الحزب عسكريا في بعض المناطق السورية، فدعم ابناء القرى السورية التي يسكنها لبنانيون اولوية، ومنع قيام «امارة» متطرفة تكون قاعدة انطلاق ضد الاراضي اللبنانية ايضا اولوية، وحماية الاماكن الشيعية المقدسة من الاولويات، لسببين الاول عقائدي، والثاني مرتبط بتداعيات وخيمة جراء اي اعتداء قد يطاول تلك المقامات،كما حصل قبل ذلك في سمراء العراقية عندما استهدف مقام الامام العسكري.
وتلفت تلك الاوساط الى ان الحملة ضد الحزب تحمل الكثير من المبالغات، اولا يجري تكبير حجم خسائره في سوريا، وهذا الامر مبالغ فيه ولا يمت الى الواقع بصلة، وجميع الشهداء شيعوا واسماؤهم معروفة، اما المبالغة الثانية فترتبط بحجم دوره الميداني، وهنا تكفي الاشارة الى مساحة سوريا الجغرافية وعدد سكانها للتأكد من محدودية دور الحزب هناك والتي تنحصر بالدفاع عن اماكن دينية محددة، والدفاع عن المناطق اللبنانية من خلال منع نشؤ «امارة اسلامية» في المناطق الحدودية، اما العمليات العسكرية الكبرى فلا قدرة على تنظيم مهما بلغ حجمه ان يقوم بها، وهذا دور يقوم بها الجيش السوري البالغ تعداده نحو 450 الف جندي وضابط ورتيب، ما زالوا يمسكون بالارض ولا يحتاجون الى مساعدة ميدانية من احد وهم يتلقون مساعدات وتدريبات لوجستية من ايران وروسيا اللتين تتواجهان مع معسكر غربي وعربي واسع على الساحة السورية.
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