An Egyptian woman holds up portrait of defense minister Abdelfatah el-Sisias as they gather in Cairo's Tahrir Square on 7 July 2013. (Photo: AFP - Khaled Desouki)
Cairo– Three behind-the-scenes episodes were responsible for “re-setting the chessboard” in Egypt, taking the political game back to square one, if not square zero.
The first episode involves Mohamed Mursi’s speech at a conference in Nasr City on June 26, a few days before protesters flooded the streets of the capital. In the speech – and to army commander Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi’s surprise – Mursi threatened his opponents and even the media.
In this vein, Al-Akhbar’s sources said that the agreement between Sisi and Mursi, which stood before the former attended the president’s speech in his capacity as defense minister, had only one condition: de-escalation at all levels with all political forces, irrespective of their views on the president’s agenda and policies.
Following Mursi’s escalation, Sisi met with other members of the supreme military council, and told them that the armed forces would give the president one week to resume national dialogue and prevent bloodshed in Egypt, or intervene before the situation deteriorates further.
Sisi also instructed the army to secure Sinai and Arish, and prevent any jihadi elements from slipping into the capital or other parts of Egypt. According to the same sources, the defense minister put the military on high alert, with chief of staff Sedki Sobhi personally overseeing its deployment plans.
The second episode involves an attempt by Mursi’s advisers to stay one step ahead of the army by keeping tabs on its senior leaders, including the commander of the Republican Guard himself.
However, the latter had taken precautionary measures, including giving officers secure phones, and in the process, he thwarted the plans of the deposed president’s aides.
According to military sources, General Intelligence intercepted communications between the presidency and the Muslim Brotherhood. Sources claimed the communications revealed plans to sack the defense minister and other senior army commanders.
The third episode follows the attempt of the deposed president to create a rift inside the military establishment itself by reaching out to military leaders behind Sisi’s back, requesting the latter’s aides search for Sisi’s replacement. However, one of those leaders informed the chief commander of these developments.
When the military leaders refused to negotiate over toppling their boss, the deposed president took the matter up with Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of the military council during the transitional period that followed Mubarak’s ouster. But Tantawi, too, refused to assist Mursi.
Fear alone drove Mursi to give Republican Guard head Mohammed Zaki a list of several opposition and media figures to arrest who had uncovered the tension between the presidency and the army. However, the head of the Republican Guard, according to the same sources, declined to execute the order. Zaki then gave the defense minister the list and briefed him on the president’s plans, which Mursi had wanted to carry out during his Nasr City speech.
These episodes, in conjunction with mass protests calling for Mursi’s ouster and snap elections, changed the army’s plans for dealing with the president. This, of course, is in addition to the deposed president’s refusal to engage in a constructive dialogue with other political forces and his making repeated hints about clashing with unarmed protesters.
Over the past week, Sisi prepared the army’s deployment plan. Sisi was expecting the president to make a statement that would appease the street, only to find Mursi stepping up his rhetoric against opponents, and even initiating contacts with US officials to put pressure on Sisi to stand down.
The calls between the Egyptian and American sides contained explicit threats to the Egyptian army, including cutting off US military aid and sacking senior commanders. Accordingly, Sisi tasked his deputy for armament affairs, Mohammed al-Assar, to contact the Americans to clarify matters. Later on, Sobhi joined Assar in the effort, and the two have since become the point men in negotiations with the US.
In the last 48 hours of Mursi’s term, Sisi sent sealed envelopes to all senior commanders, explaining his action plan and each commander’s mission. Each envelope was delivered by hand, in conjunction with tightened security in Sinai and Arish, to prevent the infiltration of jihadi militants to other cities.
According to informed sources, Sisi wrote his last speech himself, and requested it be carefully translated into all major languages to emphasize that Egypt was not witnessing a military coup, and that the army was only responding to the people’s will.
Sisi deliberately delayed his June 30 speech until the army took control of the capital and deployed in sensitive areas. When Sisi was satisfied with the measures, he ordered the speech to be broadcast, following a call from central command that everything was under control.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.
The first episode involves Mohamed Mursi’s speech at a conference in Nasr City on June 26, a few days before protesters flooded the streets of the capital. In the speech – and to army commander Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi’s surprise – Mursi threatened his opponents and even the media.
In this vein, Al-Akhbar’s sources said that the agreement between Sisi and Mursi, which stood before the former attended the president’s speech in his capacity as defense minister, had only one condition: de-escalation at all levels with all political forces, irrespective of their views on the president’s agenda and policies.
Following Mursi’s escalation, Sisi met with other members of the supreme military council, and told them that the armed forces would give the president one week to resume national dialogue and prevent bloodshed in Egypt, or intervene before the situation deteriorates further.
Sisi also instructed the army to secure Sinai and Arish, and prevent any jihadi elements from slipping into the capital or other parts of Egypt. According to the same sources, the defense minister put the military on high alert, with chief of staff Sedki Sobhi personally overseeing its deployment plans.
The second episode involves an attempt by Mursi’s advisers to stay one step ahead of the army by keeping tabs on its senior leaders, including the commander of the Republican Guard himself.
However, the latter had taken precautionary measures, including giving officers secure phones, and in the process, he thwarted the plans of the deposed president’s aides.
According to military sources, General Intelligence intercepted communications between the presidency and the Muslim Brotherhood. Sources claimed the communications revealed plans to sack the defense minister and other senior army commanders.
The third episode follows the attempt of the deposed president to create a rift inside the military establishment itself by reaching out to military leaders behind Sisi’s back, requesting the latter’s aides search for Sisi’s replacement. However, one of those leaders informed the chief commander of these developments.
When the military leaders refused to negotiate over toppling their boss, the deposed president took the matter up with Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of the military council during the transitional period that followed Mubarak’s ouster. But Tantawi, too, refused to assist Mursi.
Fear alone drove Mursi to give Republican Guard head Mohammed Zaki a list of several opposition and media figures to arrest who had uncovered the tension between the presidency and the army. However, the head of the Republican Guard, according to the same sources, declined to execute the order. Zaki then gave the defense minister the list and briefed him on the president’s plans, which Mursi had wanted to carry out during his Nasr City speech.
These episodes, in conjunction with mass protests calling for Mursi’s ouster and snap elections, changed the army’s plans for dealing with the president. This, of course, is in addition to the deposed president’s refusal to engage in a constructive dialogue with other political forces and his making repeated hints about clashing with unarmed protesters.
Over the past week, Sisi prepared the army’s deployment plan. Sisi was expecting the president to make a statement that would appease the street, only to find Mursi stepping up his rhetoric against opponents, and even initiating contacts with US officials to put pressure on Sisi to stand down.
The calls between the Egyptian and American sides contained explicit threats to the Egyptian army, including cutting off US military aid and sacking senior commanders. Accordingly, Sisi tasked his deputy for armament affairs, Mohammed al-Assar, to contact the Americans to clarify matters. Later on, Sobhi joined Assar in the effort, and the two have since become the point men in negotiations with the US.
In the last 48 hours of Mursi’s term, Sisi sent sealed envelopes to all senior commanders, explaining his action plan and each commander’s mission. Each envelope was delivered by hand, in conjunction with tightened security in Sinai and Arish, to prevent the infiltration of jihadi militants to other cities.
According to informed sources, Sisi wrote his last speech himself, and requested it be carefully translated into all major languages to emphasize that Egypt was not witnessing a military coup, and that the army was only responding to the people’s will.
Sisi deliberately delayed his June 30 speech until the army took control of the capital and deployed in sensitive areas. When Sisi was satisfied with the measures, he ordered the speech to be broadcast, following a call from central command that everything was under control.
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.