Why Don’t the Lebanese Revolt?

Before a car bomb hit Beirut's southern suburbs, clashes ensued in Abra after several Lebanese army soldiers were killed by followers of cleric Ahmad al-Assir. A few days ago, Lebanese citizen Rola Yaakoub was severely beaten to death by her husband, who is now receiving help from an MP to evade being brought to justice. Lebanese citizens have viewed these recent incidents as a continuing series of events that has no end and no conclusions.

Lebanese certainly keep up-to-date with these incidents as they occur thanks to generator-provided electricity, a staple of life for the past 25 years. They forget that as time has evolved and technology has advanced, they have increasingly turned into cavemen lacking electricity, water, Internet, and a sanitary environment.

Nothing prevents Lebanese citizens from following up on the daily series of events, except for a decisive game between the March 8 and March 14 coalitions, where they compete in interpreting the constitution whenever a particular issue arises. They keep an eye on it despite knowing in advance that the referee’s whistle will announce that the game is over once “a tribal” settlement looms.

Yet it goes even beyond this. Lebanese citizens — who think that the whole world revolves around them — quickly applaud their Egyptian counterparts, particularly when the latter embarked on the recent revolution. On this occasion, they recall their one and only revolution, which did not bring down any regime or dismiss any leader.

At the moment, when the Lebanese turn their eyes away from their current circumstances, they express their indignation, anger and rejection of the reality in which they live. They insult the country and its politicians, and curse religion and confessions. Yet, they do not revolt.

The introduction ends

Why don't the Lebanese revolt? The question may bring laughter. Some consider Lebanese and revolution to be antithetical. A revolution does not befit he who made the alphabet known to the world, who speaks more than one language, and who survived despite the wars. Many believe that the problem is the sectarian system, although some have resorted to it as a type of antidote. For a number of people, it is not worse than the country's economic and banking system, which facilitates borrowing, and therefore facilitates spending the money that citizens earned. So why would one revolt for a livelihood, as long as there are ways to secure it?

The following researchers and activists analyzed the reasons why the Lebanese yield to reality: Fadia Kiwan, a political researcher; Rajaa Makki, a researcher in social psychology and Arabi al-Andari, a freedom and civil rights activist. With the dilemma of the sectarian system as their starting point, they came to one conclusion: The concept of revolution is not reflected in the Lebanese fabric and cannot be implemented unless there are drastic changes brought about by the people, not their leaders.

Down with the civilians, long live the leaders

According to Kiwan, it is difficult for one revolution to bring together the various segments of Lebanese society. The Lebanese civil movement, she believes, has been unable to mobilize the masses, given that it is elitist and the majority of its heroes are intellectuals or middle-class.
Kiwan demonstrates her idea by dissecting civil society. In her opinion, civil society is active, “yet the private sector that has sought to reap profits and maintain material gains represents an important part of it. Moreover, its interests overlap with the politicians’ commercial and economic interests.” Thus, this part of the society has built a hidden partnership with the political class.

Neither are the unions in the best of shape. They are stirred to action only in order to meet parochial demands rather than improving the standard of life of their members. Kiwan notes that when two teachers’ unions went on strike, they did so exclusively in order to obtain an increase in their salaries, without any reference to other cost-of-living issues. Similarly, the NGOs are scattered among various issues and fail to form a cohesive pressure group to achieve their goals.

The ability to mobilize the public remains confined to sectarian political leaders who set the rules of the sectarian game. The threads of this game are what bind the people to the state — they even choose their government representatives upon the basis of sect.

Kiwan does not believe that the wide latitude for Lebanese to politically express themselves can be translated into a wider revolution seeking to topple the regime. “Public opinion is not united regarding the critical issues facing the country,” she says.

She notes that, even if there was a possibility of revolution, the Lebanese people remain fearful of change. The present government is structured by a quota system, which guarantees that all groups will be represented. Change would surely abolish this confessional system, possibly even resulting in the establishment of a regime governed by simple numerical majority.

Yet perhaps Lebanon’s confessional system has produced harsher, more potent ills. Among them is the structural reliance upon foreign powers and their whims. “Lebanese politicians are not champions of Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence, but of their foreign alliances,” Kiwan says.

According to Kiwan, there is scant hope of the government implementing a breakthrough unless the population insists on the passage of specific pieces of reformist legislation. Foremost among these is the election law, closely followed by laws promoting housing policy, social security, decentralization and educational reform.

Traits not conducive to revolution

Makki starts from the traits of the Egyptian people and compares them to Lebanese in order to demonstrate why the latter are less likely to rise up in revolution. She says that Egyptians are more inclined to love life; they are writing their history anew, drawing upon an ancient civilization stretching back thousands of years. Fundamentally, they possess a sense of revolution that is strengthened by the demographic situation in Egypt. Namely, 10 million Egyptians can assemble in multiple city squares simultaneously in order to change the regime. Even more important, the Egyptian opposition chose to confront the regime.

In Lebanon, the demographic variable does not lend themselves to popular mobilization on specific issues. That is to say, there is no opposition that is capable of uniting the population around fateful issues of common concern. As a result, the only mobilizing factor is the sectarian element, before which a revolution’s chances whither.

Makki notes that Egypt still cultivates the image of the father-leader, whether he is president of the republic or commander of the army. He is the father who must govern in accordance with the people’s interests — and if he fails, the people will topple him. In Lebanon there is no such image. Even if we killed him, says the researcher, we would quickly regret it and restore a similar figure because he provides us with a cover of belonging.

In the shadow of this reality, people look to their intellectuals. But the Lebanese intellectual, according to Makki, is not free and has no voice of his own, unconnected to authorities. The Lebanese suffer from societal schizophrenia that has left them proficient in boasting to cover their chronic crises. The researcher adds that they do not dare treat their internal ailments because they fear marginalization. The Lebanese take refuge in parading about as a defensive mechanism to cover their internal fragmentation and forgetfulness.

All of this impels one to conclude that Lebanese society remains at a primitive stage as far as the outward manifestations of modernity are concerned. In order to escape this situation, Makki believes that the Lebanese must lay down moral and political ground rules.

Seeking a starting point

Every now and then, Beirut's city center will witness protests and demonstrations that number, at best, in the hundreds. An issue like the Lebanese civil war's missing persons cannot gather more than a similar number of supporters. The same goes for the violence against women law, the struggle against sectarianism or even the electoral law.

Andari, an activist in the Union of Lebanese Democratic Youth, has long participated in these demonstrations. Through his participation, he has come to understand that revolution in Lebanon, while difficult, is not impossible. He begins from reasons that he terms “objective,” the first being that the average Lebanese does not understand himself or know his true priorities. To wit, which comes first: sect or citizenship?

In addition to this, there is a simple acceptance of the country’s status quo, a sentiment that Egyptians do not share. In Egypt, the leaders of the revolution could present a single demand and focus on a single opponent. In Lebanon, there is no consensus on the need to overthrow the confessional system, and there is no single figure whom one could work to topple.

According to Andari, there are a number of other subjective factors that hinder a revolution. The first of these is the non-convergence of priorities from which any revolution must begin. “Protesting against the rationing of electricity might be understood by some as a protest against the minister of electricity, and so they would boycott the protest, even though they are being harmed by the same rationing as the protesters,” he says.

He notes that the ongoing debate within activist circles can be divided into three views. Some call for boycotting parliament out of the belief that it its current session is being held illegally. Others oppose this view out of the conviction that it would slam the door shut on the possibility of achieving any demands. Still others adopt a third view, one which was found to be more effective through correcting the confessional regime by proposing a demand to amend the constitution. In other words, wedding a critical position toward the regime as a whole, while also demanding particular rights on a case-by-case basis.