All through the Arab Levant and the Maghreb, Islamic movements — the Muslim Brotherhood first and foremost — are fighting fierce battles in the name of “power.” Often, these battles go beyond the structure of ruling regimes, greatly harming the entirety of Arab societies.

The degree of fierceness may differ from one society to another depending on the structural nature of the particular society or the strengths and weaknesses of the different movements. The form of the existing authority — how in tune it is with the people and their aspirations for a better future — also plays a formative role.

Certainly, the political experiences of these societies with Islamic movements, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, are old and deeply rooted in some Arab regions with a history of conflicts fought in order to gain power. These experiences are casting a shadow on the developments of current events.

In Egypt, the experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in political conflicts over the existing power, with all its different identities and inclinations, traces its roots back more than 80 years. This experience, which has repeated itself, is fraught with bloody confrontations, including the assassination of political figures, large-scale arrests throughout the years and political deals. It is also characterized by a state of public appearance and compliance to the temptations of taking part in governance, even if through a marginal or auxiliary position in confrontations with other political powers perceived by the regime as being more dangerous. This justifies the claims of the regime that it is seeking democracy, more than it gives the Muslim Brotherhood a say in the process of decision-making.

The collective memory in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq holds on to the history of the Muslim Brotherhood and its role in the political conflict, which affirms that the organization is somehow “distant” from these societies. This has constantly shrouded the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in distrust in its national presence, with dangerous accusations being leveled against the organization. These include claims that it is loyal to foreign powers and drifting away from the popular mood in a way that threatens internal national unity.

It is unquestionable that the role of the Muslim Brotherhood has remained marginal in Lebanon for reasons related to the nature and fabric of society. Sunnis do not constitute a popular majority. Yet, one cannot deny the recent restoration of activity in specific environments under attenuated slogans, with keenness on disowning extremist movements in general and al-Qaeda in particular.


In Syria, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has played an influential role in political life. The organization was legal in the 1950s when it ran in the elections and won a few seats [in parliament].

In 1958, when Syria and Egypt merged under the flag of the United Arab Republic, the organization was banned but continued its work in secret. When this union was dissolved, the Muslim Brotherhood strived to restore its activity. Yet, it was impeded by the “new regime,” especially when the secular Baath party took power.

At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the regime accused the Muslim Brotherhood of being responsible for a series of assassinations that took down not just political leaders, but also scientists and societal elites, notably Alawites.

The organization even tried to seize military barracks and committed massacres. The regime responded with a collective massacre in Hama in 1982, nearly exterminating the armed organization. Whoever survived was thrown in prison.

In Iraq today, the Muslim Brotherhood is playing a role that is proving harmful to the efforts exerted to establish the foundations of national unity. The organization accuses the regime of being founded on sectarianism only to turn around and fuel another kind of sectarianism of its own.

In this way, Arabs find themselves victims as they face a vicious war between the powers that be in their respective societies, with their diverse slogans and justifications, leading to devastating results.
In general, the most prominent characteristic of the clash between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab people is the desire to assume power.

It is true that this clash is not totally new. It nonetheless reaches a bloody climax every time the Muslim Brotherhood draws near to gaining power or indeed assumes it, as was the case in Egypt. It also reaches its peak when it enters into a partnership with other political powers from a position of strength, as was the case in Tunisia.

Unfortunately this bad habit — the tendency to try to secure a monopoly on power— has not only afflicted the Muslim Brotherhood; it seems to be contagious. This incurable Arab disease has hit other nationalist and progressive parties and movements in their quest to assume power and then monopolize it by force through the army. This fact, however, is frequently overlooked.

From Syria and Iraq to South Yemen, the honor of monopolizing power was limited to nationalist and progressive movements: the Baath party in Syria and Iraq, respectively in February and March of 1963, and in South Yemen, which became the Democratic Republic of Yemen following the British Mandate after splitting from the north in summer 1967 under the command of Arab Nationalist Movement. The latter was quick to protect itself by straying from Arabism and even turning against it.

History shows that the monopolization of power by one party has been costly in all these regions. The party that once bore the flag of struggle for the sake of lofty causes such as unity, freedom, socialism or socialism, freedom, unity (herein lies the ideological difference between the Baath party, the Arab Nationalist Movement and the Nasserite Movement) was in reality trying to monopolize power. The country and people have paid the devastating price.

Be it the Baath party or the Arab Nationalist Movement, the most important thing was to breach the army through which it could control the entire state. The Baath party was able in both Syria and Iraq to achieve this aim, enabling it to move forward and consolidate power. The party disguised itself behind the National Progressive Front comprising a number of organizations with limited influence, even though it has a bright history in the context of struggle.

From the 1970s onward, it was popular in Syria and Iraq to joke about “the National Progressive Front being the property of the Baath party.”


Back to the attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to monopolize power in Egypt, it would not be unfair to say that this deep-rooted organization did not learn much from its direct experience in the conflict with the regime or from the experiences of other organizations that used to stand at the front line of national and progressive political work in other regions. These organizations, however, ruined the country when they relied on the power of the army to assume power more than the ability of a political program to mobilize the people.

Today, the countries ruled by these organizations — i.e., Syria, Iraq and Yemen — are going through civil wars fueled by foreign intervention.

In short, no political party in the Arab world, be it in the Maghreb or the Levant, is to monopolize power and rule regardless of the people’s will, who will not accept this domination. Thus, these parties cannot claim that they represent the majority of the people.

The parties that tried to take credit for nationalism, Arabism or progressivism have failed. The countries under the rule of these “eternal leaders,” who reigned in the name of these parties, had to pay a high price.

Undoubtedly, in the early stages of their “struggle for authority to establish the rule of the people by the people,” these parties were more successful in attracting the public, on the basis of principles related to the people’s political rights on their homeland, which is the ground they live on and not in paradise.

Unfortunately, the arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood to power has harmed the “homeland” and its people.

The only difference between the experience of the Baath and the Arab Nationalist Movement on the one hand, and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other, is that the latter did not stay for long in power. Meanwhile, Baath military rule dragged on for 40 years in Iraq and over 50 years in Syria.
However, the pertinent question is: Where do Iraq and Syria stand today?

We fear that the Muslim Brotherhood will continue to act recklessly and ruthlessly toward the Egyptian people, who accepted it as a political power and gave it a chance to prove itself as a leadership in power. Thus, it is only normal to ask the same question about Egypt: What will its fate be?