Published Friday, November 15, 2013
What role did the Palestinians play in the deal to secure the release of the Lebanese hostages kidnapped in Azaz?Al-Akhbar has obtained a copy of a Palestinian document containing day-to-day details of this role since September 2012 until their release on 19 October 2013.
On an official document with the letterhead “The State of Palestine – Office of the President,” an internal circular endorsed by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was sent two weeks ago to Palestinian diplomatic missions around the world. The document informed them of the role undertaken by the Palestinian National Authority in helping secure the release of the Lebanese pilgrims kidnapped in Azaz in return for two Turkish pilots kidnapped in Beirut.
The circular, drafted on behalf of Abbas by Palestinian Ambassador to Turkey Nabil Maarouf, who had been entrusted with following up the hostage issue, contains facts about the negotiations, on which Abbas and Majed Farah, Palestinian intelligence chief, was being briefed.
The Text of the Circular
What role did the Palestinians play in the deal to secure the release of the Lebanese hostages kidnapped in Azaz?Al-Akhbar has obtained a copy of a Palestinian document containing day-to-day details of this role since September 2012 until their release on 19 October 2013.
On an official document with the letterhead “The State of Palestine – Office of the President,” an internal circular endorsed by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was sent two weeks ago to Palestinian diplomatic missions around the world. The document informed them of the role undertaken by the Palestinian National Authority in helping secure the release of the Lebanese pilgrims kidnapped in Azaz in return for two Turkish pilots kidnapped in Beirut.
The circular, drafted on behalf of Abbas by Palestinian Ambassador to Turkey Nabil Maarouf, who had been entrusted with following up the hostage issue, contains facts about the negotiations, on which Abbas and Majed Farah, Palestinian intelligence chief, was being briefed.
Al-Akhbar verified some of the information contained in the circular with Ambassador Maarouf himself. His answers are placed between brackets below, next to the contents of the circular:
The Text of the Circular
“In the period of September 20-22, President Mahmoud Abbas was on an official visit to Turkey. He asked about the nine kidnapped Lebanese and the possibility of communicating with the kidnappers with a view to secure their release, given the great importance of doing so to ease tensions on the Lebanese arena, which is also conducive to the interests of Palestinians living in Lebanon. He gave me instructions to work to the utmost of my abilities on this issue because there are reports indicating they are present in northern Syria near the border with Turkey.”
“Immediately after the visit, Nabil Maarouf, between October 10 and 12, conducted an exploratory visit to Gaziantep, accompanied by Aref Saleh, where we met Palestinian refugees from Syria in Kilis and gave them financial assistance on the instructions of President Abbas. I also had the chance at the Kilis crossing to meet with Abu Ibrahim, commander of the Syrian opposition North Storm Brigade and leader of the kidnappers, along with his comrades the leaders of Liwaa al-Tawhid. We spoke about the possibility of releasing the kidnapped Lebanese. At the end of the meeting, we received encouraging signs as Abu Ibrahim made modest demands, prompting me to travel to Amman to meet with the president.”
Maarouf, in his clarifications to Al-Akhbar, said of the above, “I wanted here to go to the kidnappers’ location where they were holding the nine Lebanese hostages, but I couldn’t. I asked for help from the Turkish authorities who summoned the [kidnappers’] leaders whom I met at the Kilis crossing. They were three: leader of Liwaa al-Tawhid Abdul-Qader Saleh; another person who is a relative of Syrian political security chief Maj. Gen. Rustom Ghazali; and Abu Ibrahim.
“I spoke to them and they were positive, though Abu Ibrahim appeared the most intransigent among them. Saleh told me, ‘If I had the hostages, I would have released them for Palestine’s eyes [sake].’ He also added, ‘We must all put pressure on Abu Ibrahim to release them.’ As for Abu Ibrahim, he spoke positively, but he was not straightforward. Here, it occurred to me to call President Abbas, to make the kidnappers feel that the situation was serious and perhaps Abbas would be able to change Abu Ibrahim’s mind. And indeed, Abbas spoke to the latter on my phone, and told him the issue was important for Palestine, and that we had to work together to end strife and ease the tension (Abu Ibrahim replied with pleasantries).”
The circular adds, “In Amman, I [Maarouf] proposed to the president to make an unannounced visit to Turkey to discuss with Turkish officials the possibility of cooperating with us for the release of the Lebanese. And indeed, an unannounced visit was arranged for the president to Turkey on October 16 and 17, during which he met with the prime minister and foreign minister of Turkey, and a team from Turkish intelligence. The prime minister agreed to provide support and secure the aid requested by the kidnappers.”
Maarouf explained this part: “During my first meeting with Abu Ibrahim at the Kilis crossing, he had two specific demands and said that if they were secured, he would release the Lebanese abductees.” Maarouf declined to disclose the two demands, and said, “It’s shameful. I don’t want to mention them.” But in his circular, he described them as modest demands. Maarouf said, “What matters is that the Turks had agreed to meet the demands.”
The circular continues, “Three days after the president left, Nabil Maarouf went to Gaziantep in agreement with Turkish intelligence, which I had asked to facilitate the movements of Abu Ibrahim to the Kilis crossing and to brief him on the results of our agreement with the Turkish prime minister. But the meeting did not take place, and Maarouf returned halfway down the road after I learned that the meeting would take place with Abu Ibrahim’s delegate and not him personally.”
“In March 2013, Abu Ibrahim’s delegate contacted me and visited me in Ankara, He told me that after a battle during which the North Storm Brigade lost a number of fighters, he was furious and went to the hostages and fired at them. But he did not tell me whether anyone was killed or injured. After that, in a meeting in Ankara with Maj. Gen. Salim Idriss and Colonel Abdul-Jabbar al-Akidi of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), I learned that Abu Ibrahim had died after sustaining injuries during a battle.”
“The leadership was in contact with the Lebanese brothers, [including] politicians and security officials, in addition to phone contacts between me and Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, head of Lebanese General Security, who came on 29 April 2013 to Ankara at night and I met with him, giving him all information at my disposal. I also gave him the phone number of Samir al-Ammouri, who became the leader of the kidnappers, and direct contact was established between Abbas Ibrahim and Samir Ammouri, before the major general left at dawn to Beirut.
Maarouf told Al-Akhbar: “Maj. Gen. Ibrahim worked boldly and diligently on this issue, but I will leave him the choice to talk about the details if he wants.” Maarouf also praised the Qatari role, which he said was very helpful in the last moments.
“On 2 May 2013, I contacted Samir Ammouri and we discussed the issue. He told me that a Qatari-Turkish committee had been formed with the Muslim Scholars Association in Lebanon, and that this committee is responsible for following up on the issue and finding a solution. [Ammouri told me that] among their demands handed over to the committee was a list containing the names of female Syrian prisoners they wanted released, and also gave the committee a video of the hostages to prove they were in good condition.
“My contacts continued at close intervals with Samir Ammouri to continue the discussion and to check on the conditions of the kidnapped Lebanese. At the end of September 2013 and the beginning of October, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) began moving on Azaz, seizing some parts of it. Here, I began feeling increasingly concerned that the Lebanese would be killed during the military operations; I thus stepped up my contacts with Samir Ammouri, who reassured me about them.”
“On 1 October 2013, Samir Ammouri told me in a phone call that the issue of releasing the Lebanese was moving through the Qatari-Turkish committee, and that they had submitted a list of about 300 women to be released, a number that then shrunk to 127. He told me that the position now was as follows, ‘If the women are released, we would hand over the Lebanese abductees to the committee.’”
“On the same day, I contacted Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim and asked him whether in the event the hostages were released, there would be guarantees for the release of the 127 women and also the two Turkish pilots kidnapped in Lebanon. Ibrahim told me that he personally guaranteed it.
“On the following day, I contacted Abbas Ibrahim again and we exchanged information. I told him that our efforts would advance if the main condition, namely, guaranteeing the release of the Syrian prisoners and the Turkish pilots, is met, and Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim assured me again of this. Here, another move was necessary, namely, contacting the members of the committee to brief them on the latest developments, and I mean by this the Turkish and Qatari sides.”
“On the same day [2 October 2013], I met with Ambassador Ömer Önhon, deputy Turkish foreign minister for the Middle East, and informed him of the information and that the result would be the release of the Lebanese in Azaz, Syrian women prisoners, and the Turkish pilots, and asked him to convey the information to the competent authorities and then inform me of the Turkish position.”
“On Friday, October 4, since I did not get a response from Turkey, I re-sent the same information to Ambassador Önhon, this time in writing, in an urgent and confidential letter. Then on Friday as well, I visited the Qatari Ambassador Salem al-Shafei, and briefed him on developments and the contacts I made, and asked him to relay the information to the Qatari officials. Less than two hours later, the Qatari ambassador contacted me and told me that H.E. the Qatari Minister of Foreign Affairs Khalid al-Attiyah was inviting me to a meeting in Doha on the following day, 5 October 2013. I asked permission from President Mahmoud Abbas to travel to Qatar, and he authorized me and gave me a message to give to Attiyah asking for the full support of the Qatari government. I went to the airport to leave to Doha, and while at the airport, I received a call from Ambassador Önhon telling me that I got a green light from the Turkish government and that they would back the whole process.”
Maarouf continues in the circular, “I arrived in Doha, and on the evening of the following day [October 5] I met with the Qatari foreign minister and the Qatari intelligence chief, and submitted the information that I had and the results of my contacts. I sensed Minister Attiyah and the intelligence chief’s full seriousness in backing the effort.”
“At dawn the next day [October 6], I returned to Ankara, and without my knowledge, the Qatari team in charge of the hostage issue was on the same plane. On the following day, I met with the Qatari team in Ankara. We can say that the process started at this point, with the Qatari prime minister and Qatari intelligence chief traveling to Istanbul, while a delegate from the North Storm Brigade [Abu al-Hassan] was summoned to set things in motion with the Qataris, the Turks, and Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, through continued contacts with the kidnappers’ representative. I was also in contact with the committee and Samir Ammouri. Throughout the remaining days until October 19, there were tough negotiations where it was proposed to divide the deal into three phases, then two phases, but Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim insisted on carrying it out in one swoop, and was supported by the Qataris in this. And so it was until the Lebanese brothers were released, and with them the Turkish brothers, on October 19.”
The circular then concludes, “All the contacts that I (Maarouf) made or received, I was relaying in real time to President Mahmoud Abbas and brother Majed Farah, head of Palestinian intelligence.”
Abu Ibrahim’s Delegate at the US Embassy
Ambassador Nabil Maarouf said, “Abu Ibrahim would sometimes make demands before backtracking. It seemed to me that he did not have the power of decision in this issue, but that he was benefiting from having the issue between his hands. Because he was in charge of the kidnappers, he became a focal point. In other words, he found himself an important actor that made regional powers send him delegations and give him assistance, whether in order to have influence over the hostage issue or influence with the armed opposition inside Syria, where Abu Ibrahim commanded fighters. As is known, the opposition based abroad that the regional powers have dealings with lacks presence on the ground in Syria. This is something that Abu Ibrahim took advantage of, and I felt he wanted to prolong the drama because he benefited from it. At a later time, he tried to reach out to the Americans.”
Concerning the latter revelation, the circular mentions: “On December 3, Abu Ibrahim contacted me personally and asked me to receive his delegate, promising to facilitate the release of the Lebanese abductees. When the delegate arrived, he asked me to take him to the US embassy in Ankara, so I secured a meeting for him, and after that, the delegate returned to Gaziantep directly.
Maarouf said of this text: “It seems that the meeting did not go well. The delegate sent by Abu Ibrahim, called Shawqi, was modestly educated. The US embassy sent a staffer to meet him. I avoided asking Abu Ibrahim about what happened with his delegate at the US embassy, but given the way he was received, I can guess that the embassy did not care much for his proposals.”
The circular adds, “On 6 December 2012, Abu Ibrahim’s delegate returned to Ankara again where I met him and agreed to arrange a visit to Azaz. He told me during the meeting that if blogger Tal Malouhi and Lt. Colonel (Hussein) Harmoush are released, Abu Ibrahim would agree to release the Lebanese. On December 8, I went to Azaz and met with Abu Ibrahim and two hostages. After I was reassured about their condition, I called Lebanese Minister Trad Hamadeh, who spoke to the hostages as well. I spoke with Abu Ibrahim who demanded again the release of Malouhi and Harmoush [the first to defect from the regime], and also demanded development projects for Azaz.”
This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.- Azaz Diaries of Detention: Sakr, Erdogan, and Abu Ibrahim
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